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An online auction framework for dynamic resource provisioning in cloud computing

Published: 16 June 2014 Publication History

Abstract

Auction mechanisms have recently attracted substantial attention as an efficient approach to pricing and resource allocation in cloud computing. This work, to the authors' knowledge, represents the first online combinatorial auction designed in the cloud computing paradigm, which is general and expressive enough to both (a) optimize system efficiency across the temporal domain instead of at an isolated time point, and (b) model dynamic provisioning of heterogeneous Virtual Machine (VM) types in practice. The final result is an online auction framework that is truthful, computationally efficient, and guarantees a competitive ratio ~ e+ 1 over e-1 ~ 3.30 in social welfare in typical scenarios. The framework consists of three main steps: (1) a tailored primal-dual algorithm that decomposes the long-term optimization into a series of independent one-shot optimization problems, with an additive loss of 1 over e-1 in competitive ratio, (2) a randomized auction sub-framework that applies primal-dual optimization for translating a centralized co-operative social welfare approximation algorithm into an auction mechanism, retaining a similar approximation ratio while adding truthfulness, and (3) a primal-dual update plus dual fitting algorithm for approximating the one-shot optimization with a ratio λ close to e. The efficacy of the online auction framework is validated through theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulation studies. We are also in the hope that the framework, as well as its three independent modules, can be instructive in auction design for other related problems.

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cover image ACM Conferences
SIGMETRICS '14: The 2014 ACM international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
June 2014
614 pages
ISBN:9781450327893
DOI:10.1145/2591971
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 16 June 2014

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Author Tags

  1. cloud computing
  2. combinatorial auction
  3. online algorithms
  4. pricing
  5. resource allocation
  6. truthful mechanisms

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SIGMETRICS '14 Paper Acceptance Rate 40 of 237 submissions, 17%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 459 of 2,691 submissions, 17%

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Cited By

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  • (2024)Eris: An Online Auction for Scheduling Unbiased Distributed Learning Over Edge NetworksIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2023.333336823:6(7196-7209)Online publication date: Jun-2024
  • (2023)Delay and Price Differentiation in Cloud Computing: A Service Model, Supporting Architectures, and PerformanceACM Transactions on Modeling and Performance Evaluation of Computing Systems10.1145/35928528:3(1-40)Online publication date: 24-Jun-2023
  • (2023)Eliciting Joint Truthful Answers and Profiles From Strategic Workers in Mobile Crowdsourcing SystemsIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2022.315922822:8(4620-4633)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2023
  • (2023)Online Scheduling Algorithm for Heterogeneous Distributed Machine Learning JobsIEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing10.1109/TCC.2022.314315311:2(1514-1529)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2023
  • (2022)Cloud PricingManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2020.390768:1(105-122)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2022
  • (2022)A Reinforcement Learning Approach to Price Cloud Resources With Provable Convergence GuaranteesIEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems10.1109/TNNLS.2021.308508833:12(7448-7460)Online publication date: Dec-2022
  • (2022)On Designing Strategy-Proof Budget Feasible Online Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing With Time-Discounting ValuesIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2020.303449921:6(2088-2102)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2022
  • (2022)Sustainable Federated Learning with Long-term Online VCG Auction Mechanism2022 IEEE 42nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)10.1109/ICDCS54860.2022.00091(895-905)Online publication date: Jul-2022
  • (2022)Pricing-based resource allocation in three-tier edge computing for social welfare maximizationComputer Networks10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109311217(109311)Online publication date: Nov-2022
  • (2021)Dynamic VM Scaling: Provisioning and Pricing through an Online AuctionIEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing10.1109/TCC.2018.28409999:1(131-144)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2021
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