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Tracking Data Flow at Gate-Level through Structural Checking

Published: 18 May 2016 Publication History

Abstract

The rapid growth of Internet-of-things and other electronic devices make a huge impact on how and where data travel. The confidential data (e.g., personal data, financial information) that travel through unreliable channels can be exposed to attackers. In hardware, the confidential data such as secret cipher keys are facing the same issue. This problem is even more serious when the IP is from a 3rd party and contains scan-chains. Thus, data flow tracking is important to analyze possible leakage channels in fighting against such hardware security threats. This paper introduces a method for tracking data flow and detecting potential hardware Trojans in gate-level soft IPs using assets and Structural Checking tool.

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Cited By

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  • (2023)Secure Instruction and Data-Level Information Flow Tracking Model for RISC-VCryptography10.3390/cryptography70400587:4(58)Online publication date: 16-Nov-2023
  • (2021)Hardware Information Flow TrackingACM Computing Surveys10.1145/344786754:4(1-39)Online publication date: 3-May-2021
  • (2021)Character Reassignment for Hardware Trojan Detection2021 IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS)10.1109/MWSCAS47672.2021.9531813(861-864)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2021
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    cover image ACM Conferences
    GLSVLSI '16: Proceedings of the 26th edition on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI
    May 2016
    462 pages
    ISBN:9781450342742
    DOI:10.1145/2902961
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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    Publication History

    Published: 18 May 2016

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    Author Tags

    1. asset
    2. data flow tracking
    3. hardware security
    4. structural checking
    5. trojan detection

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    • Semiconductor Research Corporation

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    May 18 - 20, 2016
    Massachusetts, Boston, USA

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    GLSVLSI '16 Paper Acceptance Rate 50 of 197 submissions, 25%;
    Overall Acceptance Rate 312 of 1,156 submissions, 27%

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    Cited By

    View all
    • (2023)Secure Instruction and Data-Level Information Flow Tracking Model for RISC-VCryptography10.3390/cryptography70400587:4(58)Online publication date: 16-Nov-2023
    • (2021)Hardware Information Flow TrackingACM Computing Surveys10.1145/344786754:4(1-39)Online publication date: 3-May-2021
    • (2021)Character Reassignment for Hardware Trojan Detection2021 IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS)10.1109/MWSCAS47672.2021.9531813(861-864)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2021
    • (2020)Privacy Attack On IoT: a Systematic Literature Review2020 International Conference on ICT for Smart Society (ICISS)10.1109/ICISS50791.2020.9307568(1-8)Online publication date: 19-Nov-2020
    • (2019)Hardware IP Classification through Weighted Characteristics2019 IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference (HPEC)10.1109/HPEC.2019.8916225(1-6)Online publication date: Sep-2019
    • (2018)LMDet: A “Naturalness” Statistical Method for Hardware Trojan DetectionIEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems10.1109/TVLSI.2017.278142326:4(720-732)Online publication date: Apr-2018

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