Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
skip to main content
research-article

Do Humans Play Equilibrium? Modeling Human Behavior in Computational Strategic Systems

Published: 14 September 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Online auctions and other computational strategic systems where human users interact are usually analyzed based on the assumptions that the users are rational and reach an equilibrium. This article shows that these modeling assumptions lead to significant errors, and that using behaviorally appropriate assumptions is important for achieving credible predictions in such systems.

References

[1]
Lahaie, S., Pennock, D. M., Saberi, A., and Vohra, R. V. (2007). Sponsored search auctions. In Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, 699--716.
[2]
Varian, H. R. Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization 25, 6 (2007), 1163--1178.
[3]
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., and Schwarz, M. Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American Economic Review 97, 1 (2007), 242--259.
[4]
Noti, G., Nisan, N., and Yaniv, I. An experimental evaluation of bidders' behavior in ad auctions. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW '14. ACM, New York, 2014, 619--630.
[5]
Blum, A. and Mansour, Y. Learning, regret minimization, and equilibria. In Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.
[6]
Nisan, N. and Noti, G. An experimental evaluation of regret-based econometrics. In Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW '17, Republic and Canton of Geneva, Switzerland. International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee. 2017, 73--81.
[7]
Nekipelov, D., Syrgkanis, V., and Tardos, E. Econometrics for learning agents. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '15. ACM, New York, 2015, 1--18.
[8]
Nisan, N. and Noti, G. A "quantal regret" method for structural econometrics in repeated games. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '17. 2017.
[9]
Selten, R. and Chmura, T. Stationary concepts for experimental 2x2-games. American Economic Review 98, 3 (2008), 938--66.

Recommendations

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 14 September 2017
Published in XRDS Volume 24, Issue 1

Permissions

Request permissions for this article.

Check for updates

Qualifiers

  • Research-article
  • Popular
  • Refereed

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • 0
    Total Citations
  • 218
    Total Downloads
  • Downloads (Last 12 months)10
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
Reflects downloads up to 15 Oct 2024

Other Metrics

Citations

View Options

Get Access

Login options

Full Access

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Digital Edition

View this article in digital edition.

Digital Edition

Magazine Site

View this article on the magazine site (external)

Magazine Site

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media