extended-abstract

Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements

Authors:

Yannai A. Gonczarowski,

Noam Nisan,

Lior Kovalio,

Assaf RommAuthors Info & Claims

EC '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Page 321

https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329620

Published: 17 June 2019 Publication History

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Abstract

We describe our experience with designing and running a matching market for the Israeli "Mechinot" gap-year programs. The main conceptual challenge in the design of this market was the rich set of diversity considerations, which necessitated the development of an appropriate preference-specification language along with corresponding choice-function semantics, which we also theoretically analyze to a certain extent. This market was run for the first time in January 2018 and matched 1,607 candidates (out of a total of 2,580 candidates) to 35 different programs, and has been adopted by the Joint Council of the "Mechinot" gap-year programs for the foreseeable future.

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H.V. VNimbhorkar PDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via MatchingsProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662931(780-788)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3662931
K. A. SRavi RNasre MElkind E(2023)Matchings under one-sided preferences with soft quotasProceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2023/309(2774-2782)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2023/309
Rosenfeld AHassidim A(2023)Too smart for their own good: Trading truthfulness for efficiency in the Israeli medical internship marketJudgment and Decision Making10.1017/S193029750000789015:5(727-740)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2023
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1930297500007890
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Index Terms

Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements
1. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Algorithmic game theory
      2. Algorithmic mechanism design

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

EC '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

June 2019

947 pages

ISBN:9781450367929

DOI:10.1145/3328526

General Chair:
Anna Karlin
University of Washington, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Nicole Immorlica
Microsoft Research, USA
,
Ramesh Johari
Stanford University, USA

Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 17 June 2019

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Author Tags

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Extended-abstract

Funding Sources

Israel Science Foundation
Maurice Falk Institute
Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities
European Research Council
United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation

Conference

EC '19

Sponsor:

SIGecom

EC '19: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

June 24 - 28, 2019

AZ, Phoenix, USA

Acceptance Rates

EC '19 Paper Acceptance Rate 106 of 382 submissions, 28%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

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H.V. VNimbhorkar PDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via MatchingsProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662931(780-788)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3662931
K. A. SRavi RNasre MElkind E(2023)Matchings under one-sided preferences with soft quotasProceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2023/309(2774-2782)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2023/309
Rosenfeld AHassidim A(2023)Too smart for their own good: Trading truthfulness for efficiency in the Israeli medical internship marketJudgment and Decision Making10.1017/S193029750000789015:5(727-740)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2023
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1930297500007890
Liu XChan HLi MWu WZhao Y(2023)Budget-feasible Mechanisms for Proportionally Selecting Agents from GroupsArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2023.103975(103975)Online publication date: Aug-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2023.103975
Narang SBiswas ANarahari YPelachaud CTaylor MFaliszewski PMascardi V(2022)On Achieving Leximin Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One MatchingsProceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3535850.3536083(1705-1707)Online publication date: 9-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3535850.3536083
Ágoston KBiró PKováts EJankó Z(2022)College admissions with ties and common quotas: Integer programming approachEuropean Journal of Operational Research10.1016/j.ejor.2021.08.033299:2(722-734)Online publication date: Jun-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.08.033
Nguyen HNguyen TTeytelboym A(2021)Stability in Matching Markets with Complex ConstraintsManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2020.3869Online publication date: 22-Mar-2021
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3869
Robertson SNguyen TSalehi NKitamura YQuigley AIsbister KIgarashi TBjørn PDrucker S(2021)Modeling Assumptions Clash with the Real World: Transparency, Equity, and Community Challenges for Student Assignment AlgorithmsProceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems10.1145/3411764.3445748(1-14)Online publication date: 6-May-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3411764.3445748
Shen WDeng YTang P(2021)Coalitional Permutation Manipulations in the Gale-Shapley AlgorithmArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2021.103577(103577)Online publication date: Aug-2021
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Narang SNarahari YEl Fallah Seghrouchni ASukthankar GAn BYorke-Smith N(2020)A Study of Incentive Compatibility and Stability Issues in Fractional MatchingsProceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3398761.3399038(1951-1953)Online publication date: 5-May-2020
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