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Efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price Auction for Value Maximizers

Authors:

Mohammad Mahdian,

Vahab Mirrokni,

Song ZuoAuthors Info & Claims

WWW '24: Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024

Pages 46 - 56

https://doi.org/10.1145/3589334.3645360

Published: 13 May 2024 Publication History

Abstract

We study the price of anarchy of the generalized second-price auction where bidders are value maximizers (i.e., autobidders). We show that in general the price of anarchy can be as bad as 0. For comparison, the price of anarchy of running VCG is 1/2 in the autobidding world. We further show a fined-grained price of anarchy with respect to the discount factors (i.e., the ratios of click probabilities between lower slots and the highest slot in each auction) in the generalized second-price auction, which highlights the qualitative relation between the smoothness of the discount factors and the efficiency of the generalized second-price auction.

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Cited By

Feng YLucier BSlivkins AMohar BShinkar IO'Donnell R(2024)Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding WorldProceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing10.1145/3618260.3649688(213-224)Online publication date: 10-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3618260.3649688

Index Terms

Efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price Auction for Value Maximizers
1. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design

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cover image ACM Conferences

WWW '24: Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024

May 2024

4826 pages

ISBN:9798400701719

DOI:10.1145/3589334

General Chairs:
Tat-Seng Chua
National University of Singapore
,
Chong-Wah Ngo
Singapore Management University
,
Proceedings Chair:
Roy Ka-Wei Lee
Singapore University of Technology and Design
,
Program Chairs:
Ravi Kumar
Google
,
Hady W. Lauw
Singapore Management University

Copyright © 2024 Owner/Author.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License.

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Published: 13 May 2024

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WWW '24: The ACM Web Conference 2024

May 13 - 17, 2024

Singapore, Singapore

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Cited By

Feng YLucier BSlivkins AMohar BShinkar IO'Donnell R(2024)Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding WorldProceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing10.1145/3618260.3649688(213-224)Online publication date: 10-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3618260.3649688

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