survey

Survey on Architectural Attacks: A Unified Classification and Attack Model

Authors:

Tara Ghasempouri,

Cezar Reinbrecht,

Mottaqiallah TaouilAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Computing Surveys, Volume 56, Issue 2

Article No.: 42, Pages 1 - 32

https://doi.org/10.1145/3604803

Published: 15 September 2023 Publication History

Abstract

According to the World Economic Forum, cyberattacks are considered as one of the most important sources of risk to companies and institutions worldwide. Attacks can target the network, software, and/or hardware. Over the years, much knowledge has been developed to understand and mitigate cyberattacks. However, new threats have appeared in recent years regarding software attacks that exploit hardware vulnerabilities. This article defines these attacks as architectural attacks. Today, both industry and academia have only limited comprehension of architectural attacks, which represents a critical issue for the design of future systems. To this end, this work proposes a new taxonomy, a new attack model, and a complete survey of existing architectural attacks. As a result, it provides the tools to understand architectural attacks in more depth and to start building improved designs and protection mechanisms.

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Cited By

Sharma IOjha S(2023)Enhancing Prime+Probe Attack Detection Using AI and Machine Learning Techniques for Improved Security2023 Global Conference on Information Technologies and Communications (GCITC)10.1109/GCITC60406.2023.10426323(1-6)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/GCITC60406.2023.10426323
Qurashi JJambi KEassa FKhemakhem MAlsolami FBasuhail A(2023)Toward Attack Modeling Technique Addressing Resilience in Self-Driving CarIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.323342411(2652-2673)Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3233424

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Survey on Architectural Attacks: A Unified Classification and Attack Model

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cover image ACM Computing Surveys

ACM Computing Surveys Volume 56, Issue 2

February 2024

974 pages

EISSN:1557-7341

DOI:10.1145/3613559

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Publication History

Published: 15 September 2023

Online AM: 14 June 2023

Accepted: 31 May 2023

Revised: 22 April 2023

Received: 30 June 2022

Published in CSUR Volume 56, Issue 2

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Sharma IOjha S(2023)Enhancing Prime+Probe Attack Detection Using AI and Machine Learning Techniques for Improved Security2023 Global Conference on Information Technologies and Communications (GCITC)10.1109/GCITC60406.2023.10426323(1-6)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/GCITC60406.2023.10426323
Qurashi JJambi KEassa FKhemakhem MAlsolami FBasuhail A(2023)Toward Attack Modeling Technique Addressing Resilience in Self-Driving CarIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.323342411(2652-2673)Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3233424

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