AuthSaber: Automated Safety Verification of OpenID Connect Programs
Pages 2949 - 2962
Abstract
Single Sign-On (SSO)-based authentication protocols, like OpenID Connect (OIDC), play a crucial role in enhancing security and privacy in today's interconnected digital world, gaining widespread adoption among the majority of prominent authentication service providers. These protocols establish a structured framework for verifying and authenticating the identities of individuals, organizations, and devices, while avoiding the necessity of sharing sensitive credentials (e.g., passwords) with external entities. However, the security guarantees of these protocols rely on their proper implementation, and real-world implementations can, and indeed often do, contain logical programming errors leading to severe attacks, including authentication bypass and user account takeover. In response to this challenge, we present AuthSaber, an automated verifier designed to assess the real-world OIDC protocol implementations against their standard safety specifications in a scalable manner. AuthSaber addresses the challenges of expressiveness for OIDC properties, modeling multi-party interactions, and automation by first designing a novel specification language based on linear temporal logic, leveraging an automaton-based approach to constrain the space of possible interactions between OIDC entities, and incorporating several domain-specific transformations to obtain programs and properties that can be directly reasoned about by software model checkers. We evaluate AuthSaber on the 15 most popular and widely used OIDC libraries and discover 16 previously unknown vulnerabilities, all of which are responsively disclosed to the developers. Five categories of these vulnerabilities also led to new CVEs.
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Index Terms
- AuthSaber: Automated Safety Verification of OpenID Connect Programs
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5188 pages
ISBN:9798400706363
DOI:10.1145/3658644
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