Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
skip to main content
10.1145/3670865.3673477acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesecConference Proceedingsconference-collections
extended-abstract
Free access

Posterior-Mean Separable Costs of Information Acquisition

Published: 17 December 2024 Publication History

Abstract

We analyze a problem of revealed preference given state-dependent stochastic choice data in which the payoff to a decision maker (DM) only depends on their beliefs about posterior means. Often, the DM must also learn about or pay attention to the state; in applied work on this subject, a convenient assumption is that the costs of such learning are linearly dependent in the distribution over posterior means:
[EQUATION]
where z0 is the prior mean, F is the distribution of posterior means z, and c : [0, 1] → ℝ. Our characterization via posterior-mean separable costs enables the use of well-known information design techniques to solve for the optimal choice of information.
We provide testable conditions to identify whether this assumption holds. The first condition, "No Improving Actions Switches," is standard in the literature of revealed preference from choices due to information, and states that the choices for the DM conditional on the DM's signal are optimal. The second condition, "No Improving Posterior-Mean Cycles," which is novel to this paper, states that the DM cannot improve their average payoff by switching around posterior means between menus whenever the information constraints are the same.
The full paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.09496.

Cited By

View all

Recommendations

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Conferences
EC '24: Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 2024
1340 pages
ISBN:9798400707049
DOI:10.1145/3670865
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).

Sponsors

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 17 December 2024

Check for updates

Qualifiers

  • Extended-abstract

Funding Sources

Conference

EC '24
Sponsor:

Acceptance Rates

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

Upcoming Conference

EC '25
The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 7 - 11, 2025
Stanford , CA , USA

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)16
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)16
Reflects downloads up to 01 Jan 2025

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all

View Options

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Login options

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media