Coupling first-person cognitive research with neurophilosophy and enactivism: : An outline of arguments
Abstract
A core issue of embodiment is the question of how phenomenal and agentive consciousness relates to external forms of behavior. Instead of biasing the question in terms of the “hard problem” as to why and how consciousness arises from brain processes (D. Chalmers), it is suggested to ask for psychophysical correlations in a metaphysically neutral way. This, however, demands (1) to explore both sides of the problem with equivalent precision and depth—not only the physical—and (2) to develop a metaphysically neutral tool to formalize them in a consistent way. Concerning (1), the basic structure of mental micro-activities found in first-person studies on cognitive processes suggests extending the scope of qualia as a mark of consciousness. In the context of Structure Phenomenology (H. Witzenmann), functionally negative phenomenality experienced in ambiguous or meaning-deprived situations and inner agentive qualia of mental activities are correlated with the decompositional signature of sensory-neural processing and synchronized neural oscillations. Concerning (2), G. Günther’s Transclassical Logic is briefly introduced and deployed to integrate the mental, psychophysical, and physical contextures in a three-valued formal framework which also includes enacted and embodied aspects. The emerging picture rebalances first-person and third-person aspects of cognition by functionally separating and dynamically integrating them, thus revitalizing the neurophenomenological research agenda with new experimental proposals and concrete hypotheses.
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- Coupling first-person cognitive research with neurophilosophy and enactivism: An outline of arguments
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