Article

Economic mechanism design for computerized agents

Author:

Hal R. VarianAuthors Info & Claims

WOEC'95: Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1

Page 2

Published: 11 July 1995 Publication History

Abstract

The field of economic mechanism design has been an active area of research in economics for at least 20 years. This field uses the tools of economics and game theory to design "rules of interaction" for economic transactions that will, in principle, yield some desired outcome. In this paper I provide an overview of this subject for an audience interested in applications to electronic commerce and discuss some special problems that arise in this context.

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Cited By

Kumar DBaranwal GRaza ZVidyarthi D(2017)A systematic study of double auction mechanisms in cloud computingJournal of Systems and Software10.1016/j.jss.2016.12.009125:C(234-255)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.jss.2016.12.009
Huang QGui YWu FChen GZhang Q(2016)A general privacy-preserving auction mechanism for secondary spectrum marketsIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2015.243421724:3(1881-1893)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TNET.2015.2434217
Wu FZhang TQiao CChen G(2016)A Strategy-Proof Auction Mechanism for Adaptive-Width Channel Allocation in Wireless NetworksIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications10.1109/JSAC.2016.260593934:10(2678-2689)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/JSAC.2016.2605939
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Economic mechanism design for computerized agents

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cover image Guide Proceedings

WOEC'95: Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1

July 1995

160 pages

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USENIX Association

United States

Publication History

Published: 11 July 1995

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Cited By

Kumar DBaranwal GRaza ZVidyarthi D(2017)A systematic study of double auction mechanisms in cloud computingJournal of Systems and Software10.1016/j.jss.2016.12.009125:C(234-255)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.jss.2016.12.009
Huang QGui YWu FChen GZhang Q(2016)A general privacy-preserving auction mechanism for secondary spectrum marketsIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2015.243421724:3(1881-1893)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TNET.2015.2434217
Wu FZhang TQiao CChen G(2016)A Strategy-Proof Auction Mechanism for Adaptive-Width Channel Allocation in Wireless NetworksIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications10.1109/JSAC.2016.260593934:10(2678-2689)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/JSAC.2016.2605939
Zhenzhe Zheng Yang Gui Fan Wu Guihai Chen (2015)STAR: Strategy-Proof Double Auctions for Multi-Cloud, Multi-Tenant Bandwidth ReservationIEEE Transactions on Computers10.1109/TC.2014.234620464:7(2071-2083)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TC.2014.2346204
Zhu RWu FChen G(2013)SAFEProceedings of the 8th international conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications10.1007/978-3-642-39701-1_11(121-134)Online publication date: 7-Aug-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-642-39701-1_11
Parsons SRodriguez-Aguilar JKlein M(2011)Auctions and biddingACM Computing Surveys10.1145/1883612.188361743:2(1-59)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1883612.1883617
Sousa JZengin ZMalek SLewis GMetzger APistore MSmith DZisman A(2010)Towards multi-design of situated service-oriented systemsProceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Principles of Engineering Service-Oriented Systems10.1145/1808885.1808897(57-63)Online publication date: 1-May-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1808885.1808897
Zhong SWu F(2010)A collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networksIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2009.203032518:2(582-595)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TNET.2009.2030325
Gerding EDash RByde AJennings N(2008)Optimal strategies for bidding agents participating in simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substitutesJournal of Artificial Intelligence Research10.5555/1622673.162269732:1(939-982)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2008
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Schosser SBöhm KVogt B(2008)Online vs. Offline BehaviorProceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 0210.1109/WIIAT.2008.10(48-56)Online publication date: 9-Dec-2008
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/WIIAT.2008.10
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