Article

Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control

Authors:

Piotr Faliszewski,

Edith Hemaspaandra,

Lane A. Hemaspaandra,

Jörg RotheAuthors Info & Claims

AAAI'07: Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1

Pages 724 - 730

Published: 22 July 2007 Publication History

Abstract

Control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins (Bartholdi, Tovey, & Trick 1992). An election system in which such an agent's computational task is NP-hard is said to be resistant to the given type of control. Aside from election systems with an NP-hard winner problem, the only systems known to be resistant to all the standard control types are highly artificial election systems created by hybridization (Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, & Rothe 2007b). In this paper, we prove that an election system developed by the 13th century mystic Ramon Llull and the well-studied Copeland election system are both resistant to all the standard types of (constructive) electoral control other than one variant of addition of candidates. This is the most comprehensive resistance to control yet achieved by any natural election system whose winner problem is in P. In addition, we show that Llull and Copeland voting are very broadly resistant to bribery attacks, and we integrate the potential irrationality of voter preferences into many of our results.

References

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Cited By

eranov VKoczkodaj WSzybowski J(2018)Inconsistency of special cases of pairwise comparisons matricesInternational Journal of Approximate Reasoning10.1016/j.ijar.2018.01.00495:C(36-45)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.ijar.2018.01.004
Liu HZhu D(2010)Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin electionInformation Processing Letters10.1016/j.ipl.2010.03.006110:10(383-388)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.ipl.2010.03.006
Conitzer VLang JXia L(2009)How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?Proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/1661445.1661463(103-108)Online publication date: 11-Jul-2009
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cover image Guide Proceedings

AAAI'07: Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1

July 2007

942 pages

ISBN:9781577353232

Editor:
Anthony Cohn
University of Leeds

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Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

Publisher

AAAI Press

Publication History

Published: 22 July 2007

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Cited By

eranov VKoczkodaj WSzybowski J(2018)Inconsistency of special cases of pairwise comparisons matricesInternational Journal of Approximate Reasoning10.1016/j.ijar.2018.01.00495:C(36-45)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.ijar.2018.01.004
Liu HZhu D(2010)Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin electionInformation Processing Letters10.1016/j.ipl.2010.03.006110:10(383-388)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.ipl.2010.03.006
Conitzer VLang JXia L(2009)How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?Proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/1661445.1661463(103-108)Online publication date: 11-Jul-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1661445.1661463
Betzler NHemmann SNiedermeier R(2009)A multivariate complexity analysis of determining possible winners given incomplete votesProceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/1661445.1661455(53-58)Online publication date: 11-Jul-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1661445.1661455
Faliszewski PHemaspaandra EHemaspaandra L(2009)How hard is bribery in elections?Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research10.5555/1641503.164151435:1(485-532)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1641503.1641514
Faliszewski PHemaspaandra EHemaspaandra LRothe J(2009)Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive controlJournal of Artificial Intelligence Research10.5555/1641503.164151035:1(275-341)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1641503.1641510
Betzler NFellows MGuo JNiedermeier RRosamond FSierra CCastelfranchi CDecker KSichman J(2009)How similarity helps to efficiently compute Kemeny rankingsProceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 110.5555/1558013.1558104(657-664)Online publication date: 10-May-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1558013.1558104
Faliszewski PHemaspaandra EHemaspaandra LRothe JHeifetz A(2009)The shield that never wasProceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge10.1145/1562814.1562832(118-127)Online publication date: 6-Jul-2009
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Betzler NFellows MGuo JNiedermeier RRosamond F(2009)Fixed-parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankingsTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2009.08.033410:45(4554-4570)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2009
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Betzler NUhlmann J(2009)Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problemsTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2009.05.029410:52(5425-5442)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2009
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