chapter

Impossibility results for RFID privacy notions

Authors:

Frederik Armknecht,

Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi,

Alessandra Scafuro,

Christian WachsmannAuthors Info & Claims

Transactions on computational science XI: special issue on security in computing, part II

January 2010

Pages 39 - 63

Published: 01 January 2010 Publication History

Abstract

RFID systems have become increasingly popular and are already used in many real-life applications. Although very useful, RFIDs introduce privacy risks since they carry identifying information that can be traced. Hence, several RFID privacy models have been proposed. However, they are often incomparable and in part do not reflect the capabilities of real-world adversaries. Recently, Paise and Vaudenay presented a general RFID security and privacy model that abstracts and unifies most previous approaches. This model defines mutual authentication (between RFID tags and readers) and several privacy notions that capture adversaries with different tag corruption behavior and capabilities.

In this paper, we revisit the model proposed by Paise and Vaudenay and investigate some subtle issues such as tag corruption aspects. We show that in their formal definitions tag corruption discloses the temporary memory of tags and leads to the impossibility of achieving both mutual authentication and any reasonable notion of RFID privacy in their model. Moreover, we show that the strongest privacy notion (narrow-strong privacy) cannot be achieved simultaneously with reader authentication even under the strong assumption that tag corruption does not disclose temporary tag states. Further, we show other impossibility results that hold if the adversary can manipulate an RFID tag such that it resets its state or when tags are stateless.

Although our results are shown on the privacy definition by Paise and Vaudenay, they give insight to the difficulties of setting up a mature security and privacy model for RFID systems that aims at fulfilling the sophisticated requirements of real-life applications.

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Cited By

Yang ALiang KZhuang YWong DJia X(2015)A new unpredictability-based radio frequency identification forward privacy model and a provably secure constructionSecurity and Communication Networks10.1002/sec.12088:16(2836-2849)Online publication date: 10-Nov-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1002/sec.1208
Hermans JPashalidis AVercauteren FPreneel B(2011)A new RFID privacy modelProceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security10.5555/2041225.2041266(568-587)Online publication date: 12-Sep-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2041225.2041266

Index Terms

Impossibility results for RFID privacy notions
1. Security and privacy

Index terms have been assigned to the content through auto-classification.

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cover image Guide books

Transactions on computational science XI: special issue on security in computing, part II

January 2010

292 pages

ISBN:3642176968

Editors:
Marina L. Gavrilova
University of Calgary, Department of Computer Science, Calgary, AB, Canada
,
C. J. Kenneth Tan
Exascala Ltd., Birmingham, UK
,
Edward David Moreno
DCOMP, Federal University of Sergipe, Aracaju, SE, Brazil

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Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 01 January 2010

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Cited By

Yang ALiang KZhuang YWong DJia X(2015)A new unpredictability-based radio frequency identification forward privacy model and a provably secure constructionSecurity and Communication Networks10.1002/sec.12088:16(2836-2849)Online publication date: 10-Nov-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1002/sec.1208
Hermans JPashalidis AVercauteren FPreneel B(2011)A new RFID privacy modelProceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security10.5555/2041225.2041266(568-587)Online publication date: 12-Sep-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2041225.2041266

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