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A framework for modeling population strategies by depth of reasoning

Published: 04 June 2012 Publication History

Abstract

This article presents a population-based cognitive hierarchy model that can be used to estimate the reasoning depth and sophistication of a collection of opponents' strategies from observed behavior in repeated games. This framework provides a compact representation of a distribution of complicated strategies by reducing them to a small number of parameters. This estimated population model can be then used to compute a best response to the observed distribution over these parameters. As such, it provides a basis for building improved strategies given a history of observations of the community of agents. Results show that this model predicts and explains the winning strategies in the recent 2011 Lemonade Stand Game competition, where eight algorithms were pitted against each other. The Lemonade Stand Game is a three-player game with simple rules that includes both cooperative and competitive elements. Despite its apparent simplicity, the fact that success depends crucially on what other players do gives rise to complex interaction patterns, which our new framework captures well.

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Cited By

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  • (2019)Towards efficient detection and optimal response against sophisticated opponentsProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3367032.3367121(623-629)Online publication date: 10-Aug-2019
  • (2019)Bayes-ToMoPProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3332085(2282-2284)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
  • (2017)Hotelling-Downs Model with Limited AttractionProceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3091125.3091220(660-668)Online publication date: 8-May-2017

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  1. A framework for modeling population strategies by depth of reasoning

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    Published In

    cover image ACM Other conferences
    AAMAS '12: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
    June 2012
    601 pages
    ISBN:0981738125

    Sponsors

    • The International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: The International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

    In-Cooperation

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    International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

    Richland, SC

    Publication History

    Published: 04 June 2012

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    Author Tags

    1. iterated reasoning
    2. learning in populations
    3. multiagent learning

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    AAMAS 12
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    • The International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

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    Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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    View all
    • (2019)Towards efficient detection and optimal response against sophisticated opponentsProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3367032.3367121(623-629)Online publication date: 10-Aug-2019
    • (2019)Bayes-ToMoPProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3332085(2282-2284)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
    • (2017)Hotelling-Downs Model with Limited AttractionProceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3091125.3091220(660-668)Online publication date: 8-May-2017

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