Article

Cryptanalysis of a universally verifiable efficient re-encryption mixnet

Authors:

Shahram Khazaei,

Björn Terelius,

Douglas WikströmAuthors Info & Claims

EVT/WOTE'12: Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections

Page 7

Published: 06 August 2012 Publication History

Abstract

We study the heuristically secure mix-net proposed by Puiggalí and Guasch (EVOTE 2010). We present practical attacks on both correctness and privacy for some sets of parameters of the scheme. Although our attacks only allow us to replace a few inputs, or to break the privacy of a few voters, this shows that the scheme can not be proven secure.

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Norwegian E-VOTE 2011 Project. http: //www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/krd/ prosjekter/e-vote-2011-project.html. 17 February, 2012.

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J. Puiggalí. Private communication. January, 2012.

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J. Puiggalí Allepuz and S. Guasch Castelló. Universally verifiable efficient re-encryption mixnet. In R. Krimmer and R. Grimm, editors, Electronic Voting, volume 167 of LNI, pages 241-254. GI, 2010.

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Cited By

Syta ECorrigan-Gibbs HWeng SWolinsky DFord BJohnson A(2014)Security Analysis of Accountable Anonymity in DissentACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)10.1145/262962117:1(1-35)Online publication date: 15-Aug-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2629621

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Published In

cover image Guide Proceedings

EVT/WOTE'12: Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections

August 2012

12 pages

Program Chairs:
J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan
,
Olivier Pereira
Université Catholique de Louvain

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USENIX Association

United States

Publication History

Published: 06 August 2012

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Cited By

Syta ECorrigan-Gibbs HWeng SWolinsky DFord BJohnson A(2014)Security Analysis of Accountable Anonymity in DissentACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)10.1145/262962117:1(1-35)Online publication date: 15-Aug-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2629621

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