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Hulk: eliciting malicious behavior in browser extensions

Published: 20 August 2014 Publication History

Abstract

We present Hulk, a dynamic analysis system that detects malicious behavior in browser extensions by monitoring their execution and corresponding network activity. Hulk elicits malicious behavior in extensions in two ways. First, Hulk leverages HoneyPages, which are dynamic pages that adapt to an extension's expectations in web page structure and content. Second, Hulk employs a fuzzer to drive the numerous event handlers that modern extensions heavily rely upon. We analyzed 48K extensions from the Chrome Web store, driving each with over 1M URLs. We identify a number of malicious extensions, including one with 5.5 million affected users, stressing the risks that extensions pose for today's web security ecosystem, and the need to further strengthen browser security to protect user data and privacy.

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    Published In

    cover image Guide Proceedings
    SEC'14: Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX conference on Security Symposium
    August 2014
    1067 pages
    ISBN:9781931971157
    • Program Chair:
    • Kevin Fu

    Sponsors

    • Akamai: Akamai
    • Google Inc.
    • IBMR: IBM Research
    • NSF
    • Microsoft Reasearch: Microsoft Reasearch
    • USENIX Assoc: USENIX Assoc

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    USENIX Association

    United States

    Publication History

    Published: 20 August 2014

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