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Why prices need algorithms

Published: 09 July 2016 Publication History

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References

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Léon Walras. Elements of Pure Economics . Allen and Unwin, 1874. Published in 1954.

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cover image Guide Proceedings
IJCAI'16: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
July 2016
4277 pages
ISBN:9781577357704

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Published: 09 July 2016

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