extended-abstract

Coping with Hardness of Welfare Maximization by Introducing Useful Complexity Measures

Author:

Rani IzsakAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '17: Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems

Pages 1838 - 1839

Published: 08 May 2017 Publication History

Get Access

Abstract

We introduce complexity measures for set functions and apply them to the welfare maximization problem.

References

[1]

I. Abraham, M. Babaioff, S. Dughmi, and T. Roughgarden. Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements. In EC, pages 3--16, 2012.

Digital Library

Google Scholar

[2]

Y. Chevaleyre, U. Endriss, S. Estivie, and N. Maudet. Multiagent resource allocation in k-additive domains: preference representation and complexity. Annals of Operations Research, 163:49--62, 2008.

Crossref

Google Scholar

[3]

V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and P. Santi. Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations. In AAAI, pages 248--254, 2005.

Digital Library

Google Scholar

[4]

U. Feige, M. Feldman, N. Immorlica, R. Izsak, B. Lucier, and V. Syrgkanis. A unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes. In AAAI, pages 872--878, 2015.

Digital Library

Google Scholar

[5]

U. Feige and R. Izsak. Welfare maximization and the supermodular degree. In ITCS, pages 247--256, 2013.

Digital Library

Google Scholar

[6]

M. Feldman and R. Izsak. Constrained monotone function maximization and the supermodular degree. In APPROX, pages 160--175, 2014.

Google Scholar

[7]

M. Feldman and R. Izsak. Building a good team: Secretary problems and the supermodular degree. In SODA, pages 1651--1670, 2017.

Digital Library

Google Scholar

[8]

R. Izsak. Working together: Committee selection and the supermodular degree. In AAMAS, 2017. accepted as an extended abstract.

Digital Library

Google Scholar

[9]

R. Izsak and O. Svensson. Online welfare maximization: Beyond submodularity, 2016. In preparation.

Google Scholar

Index Terms

Recommendations

Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization
EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

We study the problem of a seller dynamically pricing d distinct types of indivisible goods, when faced with the online arrival of unit-demand buyers drawn independently from an unknown distribution. The goods are not in limited supply, but can only be ...
Item pricing for revenue maximization
EC '08: Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

We consider the problem of pricing n items to maximize revenue when faced with a series of unknown buyers with complex preferences, and show that a simple pricing scheme achieves surprisingly strong guarantees.

We show that in the unlimited supply ...
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
EC '08: Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidders in a way that maximizes the sum of bidders' values for their allocated ...

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

AAMAS '17: Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems

May 2017

1914 pages

General Chairs:
Kate Larson
University of Waterloo, Canada
,
Michael Winikoff
University of Otago, New Zealand
,
Program Chairs:
Sanmay Das
Washington University in St. Louis, USA
,
Edmund Durfee
University of Michigan, USA

In-Cooperation

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 08 May 2017

Check for updates

Author Tags

Qualifiers

Extended-abstract

Funding Sources

I-CORE Program of the Planning and Budgeting Committee and the Israel Science Foundation
ERC-StG
Israel Science Foundation

Acceptance Rates

AAMAS '17 Paper Acceptance Rate 127 of 457 submissions, 28%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

Other Metrics

View Article Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

0
Total Citations
41
Total Downloads

Downloads (Last 12 months)1
Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0

Reflects downloads up to 16 Jan 2025

Other Metrics

View Author Metrics

Citations

View Options

Login options

Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

Index Terms

Recommendations

Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization

Item pricing for revenue maximization

Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions