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Multi-hypervisor virtual machines: enabling an ecosystem of hypervisor-level services

Published: 12 July 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Public cloud software marketplaces already offer users a wealth of choice in operating systems, database management systems, financial software, and virtual networking, all deployable and configurable at the click of a button. Unfortunately, this level of customization has not extended to emerging hypervisor-level services, partly because traditional virtual machines (VMs) are fully controlled by only one hypervisor at a time. Currently, a VM in a cloud platform cannot concurrently use hypervisor-level services from multiple third-parties in a compartmentalized manner. We propose the notion of a multi-hypervisorVM , which is an unmodified guest that can simultaneously use services from multiple coresident, but isolated, hypervisors. We present a new virtualization architecture, called Span virtualization, that leverages nesting to allow multiple hypervisors to concurrently control a guest's memory, virtual CPU, and I/O resources. Our prototype of Span virtualization on the KVM/QEMU platform enables a guest to use services such as introspection, network monitoring, guest mirroring, and hypervisor refresh, with performance comparable to traditional nested VMs.

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Cited By

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  • (2019)Fast and live hypervisor replacementProceedings of the 15th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS International Conference on Virtual Execution Environments10.1145/3313808.3313821(45-58)Online publication date: 14-Apr-2019

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cover image Guide Proceedings
USENIX ATC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 USENIX Conference on Usenix Annual Technical Conference
July 2017
811 pages
ISBN:9781931971386

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Published: 12 July 2017

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  • (2019)Fast and live hypervisor replacementProceedings of the 15th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS International Conference on Virtual Execution Environments10.1145/3313808.3313821(45-58)Online publication date: 14-Apr-2019

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