Walrasian Equilibria in Markets with Small Demands
Pages 413 - 419
Abstract
We study the complexity of finding a Walrasian equilibrium in markets where the agents have k-demand valuations. These valuations are an extension of unit-demand valuations where a bundle's value is the maximum of its k-subsets' values. For unit-demand agents, where the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed, we show that the problem is in quasi-NC. For $k=2$, we show that it is NP-hard to decide if a Walrasian equilibrium exists even if the valuations are submodular, while for $k=3$ the hardness carries over to budget-additive valuations. In addition, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for markets with 2-demand single-minded valuations, or unit-demand valuations.
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Index Terms
- Walrasian Equilibria in Markets with Small Demands
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Published In
May 2021
1899 pages
ISBN:9781450383073
- General Chairs:
- Frank Dignum,
- Alessio Lomuscio,
- Program Chairs:
- Ulle Endriss,
- Ann Nowé
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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
Publication History
Published: 03 May 2021
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- Alexander von Humboldt Foundation - funds from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF)
- EPSRC grant
- NeST initiative of the School of EEE and CS at the University of Liverpool
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AAMAS '21
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AAMAS '21: 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
May 3 - 7, 2021
Virtual Event, United Kingdom
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