research-article

Best of Both Worlds: Agents with Entitlements

Authors:

Marco Schmalhofer,

Giovanna VarricchioAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '23: Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Pages 564 - 572

Published: 30 May 2023 Publication History

Abstract

Fair division of indivisible goods is a central challenge in artificial intelligence. For many prominent fairness criteria including envy-freeness (EF) or proportionality (PROP), no allocations satisfying these criteria might exist. Two popular remedies to this problem are randomization or relaxation of fairness concepts. A timely research direction is to combine the advantages of both, commonly referred to as Best of Both Worlds (BoBW).

We consider fair division with entitlements, which allows to adjust notions of fairness to heterogeneous priorities among agents. This is an important generalization to standard fair division models and is not well-understood in terms of BoBW results. Our main result is a lottery for additive valuations and different entitlements that is ex-ante weighted envy-free (WEF), as well as ex-post weighted proportional up to one good (WPROP1) and weighted transfer envy-free up to one good (WEF(1,1)). It can be computed in strongly polynomial time. We show that this result is tight -- ex-ante WEF is incompatible with any stronger ex-post WEF relaxation.

In addition, we extend BoBW results on group fairness to entitlements and explore generalizations of our results to instances with more expressive valuation functions.

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Cited By

H.V. VNimbhorkar PDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via MatchingsProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662931(780-788)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3662931

Index Terms

Best of Both Worlds: Agents with Entitlements
1. Computing methodologies
  1. Artificial intelligence
    1. Philosophical/theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence
2. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Algorithmic game theory

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cover image ACM Conferences

AAMAS '23: Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

May 2023

3131 pages

ISBN:9781450394321

General Chairs:
Noa Agmon
Bar-Ilan University, Israel
,
Bo An
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
,
Program Chairs:
Alessandro Ricci
University of Bologna, Italy
,
William Yeoh
Washington University in St. Louis, USA

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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 30 May 2023

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AAMAS '23

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SIGAI

AAMAS '23: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

May 29 - June 2, 2023

London, United Kingdom

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Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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Cited By

H.V. VNimbhorkar PDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via MatchingsProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662931(780-788)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3662931

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