BAR Nash Equilibrium and Application to Blockchain Design
Pages 2435 - 2437
Abstract
This paper presents a novel solution concept, called BAR Nash Equilibrium (BARNE) and applies it to analyse the Verifier's dilemma, a fundamental problem in blockchain. Our solution concept adapts the Nash equilibrium (NE) to accommodate interactions among Byzantine, altruistic and rational agents, which became known as the BAR setting in the literature. We prove the existence of BARNE in a large class of games and introduce two natural refinements, global and local stability. Using this equilibrium and its refinements, we analyse the free-rider problem in the context of Byzantine consensus. We demonstrate that by incorporating fines and forced errors into a standard quorum-based blockchain protocol, we can effectively reestablish honest behavior as a globally stable BARNE.
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Published In
May 2024
2898 pages
ISBN:9798400704864
- General Chairs:
- Mehdi Dastani,
- Jaime Simão Sichman,
- Program Chairs:
- Natasha Alechina,
- Virginia Dignum
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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
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Published: 06 May 2024
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AAMAS '24: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
May 6 - 10, 2024
Auckland, New Zealand
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