Article

Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding

Authors:

Sankarshan Damle,

Moin Hussain Moti,

Praphul Chandra,

Sujit GujarAuthors Info & Claims

PRICAI 2021: Trends in Artificial Intelligence: 18th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, PRICAI 2021, Hanoi, Vietnam, November 8–12, 2021, Proceedings, Part I

Pages 18 - 32

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89188-6_2

Published: 08 November 2021 Publication History

Abstract

Civic crowdfunding (CC) is a popular medium for raising funds for public projects from interested agents. With Blockchains gaining traction, we can implement CC reliably and transparently with smart contracts (SCs). The fundamental challenge in CC is free-riding. PPR, the proposal by Zubrickas [21] of giving refund bonus to the contributors when the project is not provisioned, has attractive properties. As observed by Chandra et al. [6], PPR incentivizes the agents to defer their contribution until the deadline, i.e., a race condition. For this, their proposal, PPS, considers temporal aspects of a contribution. However, PPS is computationally complex and expensive to implement as an SC. In this work, we identify essential properties a refund bonus scheme must satisfy to curb free-riding while avoiding the race condition. We prove Contribution Monotonicity and Time Monotonicity as sufficient conditions for this. We show that if a unique equilibrium is desirable, these conditions are also necessary. We propose three refund bonus schemes satisfying these conditions leading to three novel mechanisms for CC - PPRG, PPRE, and PPRP. We show that PPRG is the most cost-effective when deployed as an SC. We prove that under certain modest assumptions, in PPRG, the project is funded at equilibrium.

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Cited By

Padala MDamle SGujar S(2021)Learning Equilibrium Contributions in Multi-project Civic CrowdfundingIEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology10.1145/3486622.3493918(368-375)Online publication date: 14-Dec-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3486622.3493918

Index Terms

Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Computing methodologies
  1. Artificial intelligence
    1. Distributed artificial intelligence

Index terms have been assigned to the content through auto-classification.

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Published In

cover image Guide Proceedings

PRICAI 2021: Trends in Artificial Intelligence: 18th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, PRICAI 2021, Hanoi, Vietnam, November 8–12, 2021, Proceedings, Part I

Nov 2021

619 pages

ISBN:978-3-030-89187-9

DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-89188-6

Editors:
Duc Nghia Pham
MIMOS Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
,
Thanaruk Theeramunkong
Sirindhorn International Institute of Science and Technology, Thammasat University, Mueang Pathum Thani, Thailand
,
Guido Governatori
Data61, CSIRO, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
,
Fenrong Liu
Department of Philosophy, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021.

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Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 08 November 2021

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Cited By

Padala MDamle SGujar S(2021)Learning Equilibrium Contributions in Multi-project Civic CrowdfundingIEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology10.1145/3486622.3493918(368-375)Online publication date: 14-Dec-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3486622.3493918

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