Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
skip to main content
article

Item pricing for revenue maximization

Published: 01 November 2008 Publication History

Abstract

In this note we report recent results on item pricing for revenue maximization in the presence of buyers with complex, unknown preferences. We focus on two important classes of settings: buyers with general valuations for the case of items in unlimited supply, and buyers with subadditive valuations for the case of items in limited supply.

References

[1]
BALCAN, M.-F., BLUM, A., AND MANSOUR, Y. 2008. Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce.
[2]
BRIEST, P., HOEFER, M., AND KRYSTA., P. 2008. Stackelberg network pricing games. In Proceedings of the 25th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science.
[3]
CRAMTON, P., SHOAM, Y., AND STEINBERG, R. 2005. Combinatorial Auctions. Springer-Verlag.
[4]
DOBZINSKI, S. 2007. Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. In Proceedings of the 10th Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems.
[5]
DOBZINSKI, S. AND NISAN, N. 2007. Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce.
[6]
DOBZINSKI, S., NISAN, N., AND SCHAPIRA, M. 2006. Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. In Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. 644-652.
[7]
FEIGE, U. 2006. On maximizing Welfare when Utility Functions are Subadditive. In Proceedings of the 38th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing.
[8]
GURUSWAMI, V., HARTLINE, J., KARLIN, A., KEMPE, D., KENYON, C., AND MCSHERRY, F. 2005. On Profit-Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. 1164-1173.
[9]
LAVI, R. AND SWAMY, C. 2005. Truthful and Near-optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming. In 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[10]
LEHMANN, B., LEHMANN, D., AND NISAN, N. 2006. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. Games and Economic Behavior.
[11]
LEHMANN, D., OCALLAGHAN, L. I., AND SHOHAM, Y. 2002. Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM (JACM) 49, 577-602.
[12]
NISAN, N. 2007. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists). In Algorithmic Game Theory, N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Eds. Cambridge University Press.

Cited By

View all
  • (2017)A Sublogarithmic Approximation for Tollbooth Pricing on TreesMathematics of Operations Research10.1287/moor.2016.080342:2(377-388)Online publication date: May-2017

Recommendations

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM SIGecom Exchanges
ACM SIGecom Exchanges  Volume 7, Issue 3
November 2008
71 pages
EISSN:1551-9031
DOI:10.1145/1486877
Issue’s Table of Contents

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 November 2008
Published in SIGECOM Volume 7, Issue 3

Check for updates

Author Tags

  1. combinatorial auctions
  2. item pricing
  3. revenue maximization

Qualifiers

  • Article

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)3
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
Reflects downloads up to 08 Feb 2025

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all
  • (2017)A Sublogarithmic Approximation for Tollbooth Pricing on TreesMathematics of Operations Research10.1287/moor.2016.080342:2(377-388)Online publication date: May-2017

View Options

Login options

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Figures

Tables

Media

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media