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EC '15: Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
ACM2015 Proceeding
Publisher:
  • Association for Computing Machinery
  • New York
  • NY
  • United States
Conference:
EC '15: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Portland Oregon USA June 15 - 19, 2015
ISBN:
978-1-4503-3410-5
Published:
15 June 2015
Sponsors:

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Abstract

The papers in these Proceedings were presented at the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'15), held June 15-19, 2015 in Portland, Oregon, United States. Since 1999 the ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce (SIGecom) has sponsored EC, the leading scientific conference on advances in theory, systems, and applications at the interface of economics and computation, including applications to electronic commerce. The papers were selected by the program committee from among 220 submissions that were received by February 11, 2015. Paper submissions were invited in the following three non-exclusive focus areas:

  • TF: Theory and Foundations

  • AI: Artificial Intelligence and Applied Game Theory

  • EA: Experimental, Empirical, and Applications

The call for papers attracted 220 distinct submissions that were deemed to satisfy the formatting requirements. Each paper was reviewed by at least three program committee members and two senior program committee members on the basis of significance, scientific novelty, technical quality, readability, and relevance to the conference. Following the tradition of recent iterations of the conference, the authors were asked to align their submission with one or two of the tracks.

Of the total of 220 submissions, 131 indicated TF track of them 48 were accepted, 25 indicated AI track, of these 8 were accepted, 23 indicated EA track of these 7 were accepted, 41 papers indicated two tracks, of these 9 papers were accepted.

45 of the accepted papers are published in these Proceedings. For the remaining 27, at the authors' request, only abstracts are included along with pointers to full working papers that the authors guarantee to be reliable for at least two years. This option accommodates the practices of fields outside of computer science in which conference publishing can preclude journal publishing. We expect that many of the papers in these Proceedings will appear in a more polished and complete form in scientific journals in the future.

Papers were presented in parallel sessions with the exception of a plenary session with the following papers that received best paper and best student paper awards:

Best paper: Econometrics for Learning Agents, by Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Eva Tardos

Best student paper: Why Prices Need Algorithms, by Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen

To emphasize commonalities among the problems studied at EC, and to facilitate interchange at the conference, sessions were organized by topic rather than by focus area, and no indication of a paper's focus area(s) was given at the conference or appears in these proceedings.

In addition to the main technical program, EC'15 featured the following plenary sessions:

  • ACM SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award talk, by Balasubramanian Sivan

  • ACM SIGecom Test of Time Award talk, by Eric J. Friedman and Paul Resnick

Finally, EC also featured a poster session that included 19 papers.

We hope that you find this program interesting and thought-provoking and that the conference provides you with a valuable opportunity to share ideas with other researchers from institutions around the world.

SESSION: Session 11B
abstract
Reverse Mechanism Design

Optimal mechanisms for agents with multi-dimensional preferences are generally complex. This complexity makes them challenging to solve for and impractical to run. In a typical mechanism design approach, a model is posited and then the optimal mechanism ...

research-article
Price Competition, Fluctuations and Welfare Guarantees

In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the online sale of ...

abstract
Robust Dynamic Pricing With Strategic Customers

We consider the canonical problem of revenue management (RM) wherein a seller must sell an inventory of some product over a finite horizon via an anonymous, posted price mechanism. Unlike typical models in RM, we assume that customers are forward ...

Cited By

    Contributors
    • Columbia University
    • Tel Aviv University

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    1. Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
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      Acceptance Rates

      EC '15 Paper Acceptance Rate 72 of 220 submissions, 33%;
      Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%
      YearSubmittedAcceptedRate
      EC '1938210628%
      EC '182697026%
      EC '172577529%
      EC '162428033%
      EC '152207233%
      EC '142908028%
      EC '132237232%
      EC '041462416%
      EC '031102119%
      EC '011003535%
      EC '001502919%
      Overall2,38966428%