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The papers in these Proceedings were presented at the Twenty First ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), held between July 13 and 17, 2020. While the conference was originally scheduled to take place in Budapest, Hungary, it was moved to a virtual online format because of the COVID-19 worldwide pandemic.
The program committee selected 99 papers from among 491 submissions. Papers were invited in the following four tracks:
Theory
Applied Modeling
Artificial Intelligence and Computation
Empirics
Most papers were reviewed by at least three program committee members and one senior program committee member on the basis of significance, scientific novelty, technical quality, readability, and relevance to the conference. Following the tradition of recent iterations of the conference, the authors were asked to align their submission with one of the four tracks. The next table summarizes the number of submissions and the number of accepted papers for each track.
Allocation with Correlated Information: Too Good to be True
A principal can allocate a good to an agent. The agent privately learns the value of the good while the principal privately learns the cost. Value and cost are correlated. The agent wants to have the good in any case. The principal wants to allocate ...
Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests
Given a directed forest-graph, a probabilistic selection mechanismis a probability distribution over the vertex set. A selection mechanism is incentive-compatible(IC), if the probability assigned to a vertex does not change when we alter its outgoing ...
Characterization of Group-strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location in Strictly Convex Space
We characterize the class of group-strategyproof mechanisms for the single facility location game in any unconstrained strictly convex space. A mechanism is group-strategyproof,if no group of agents can misreport so that all its members are ...