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EC '20: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
ACM2020 Proceeding
Publisher:
  • Association for Computing Machinery
  • New York
  • NY
  • United States
Conference:
EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Virtual Event Hungary July 13 - 17, 2020
ISBN:
978-1-4503-7975-5
Published:
13 July 2020
Sponsors:
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Abstract

The papers in these Proceedings were presented at the Twenty First ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), held between July 13 and 17, 2020. While the conference was originally scheduled to take place in Budapest, Hungary, it was moved to a virtual online format because of the COVID-19 worldwide pandemic.

The program committee selected 99 papers from among 491 submissions. Papers were invited in the following four tracks:

  • Theory

  • Applied Modeling

  • Artificial Intelligence and Computation

  • Empirics

Most papers were reviewed by at least three program committee members and one senior program committee member on the basis of significance, scientific novelty, technical quality, readability, and relevance to the conference. Following the tradition of recent iterations of the conference, the authors were asked to align their submission with one of the four tracks. The next table summarizes the number of submissions and the number of accepted papers for each track.

SESSION: Session 2c: Mechanism Design without Money
abstract
Allocation with Correlated Information: Too Good to be True

A principal can allocate a good to an agent. The agent privately learns the value of the good while the principal privately learns the cost. Value and cost are correlated. The agent wants to have the good in any case. The principal wants to allocate ...

research-article
Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests

Given a directed forest-graph, a probabilistic selection mechanismis a probability distribution over the vertex set. A selection mechanism is incentive-compatible(IC), if the probability assigned to a vertex does not change when we alter its outgoing ...

research-article
Public Access
Characterization of Group-strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location in Strictly Convex Space

We characterize the class of group-strategyproof mechanisms for the single facility location game in any unconstrained strictly convex space. A mechanism is group-strategyproof,if no group of agents can misreport so that all its members are ...

Contributors
  • Institute of Economics
  • Northwestern University
  • Stanford University

Recommendations

Acceptance Rates

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%
YearSubmittedAcceptedRate
EC '1938210628%
EC '182697026%
EC '172577529%
EC '162428033%
EC '152207233%
EC '142908028%
EC '132237232%
EC '041462416%
EC '031102119%
EC '011003535%
EC '001502919%
Overall2,38966428%