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R2C: AOCR-Resilient Diversity with Reactive and Reflective Camouflage
EuroSys '23: Proceedings of the Eighteenth European Conference on Computer SystemsPages 488–504https://doi.org/10.1145/3552326.3587439Address-oblivious code reuse, AOCR for short, poses a substantial security risk, as it remains unchallenged. If neglected, adversaries have a reliable way to attack systems, offering an operational and profitable strategy. AOCR's authors conclude that ...
- research-articleNovember 2020
Speculative Probing: Hacking Blind in the Spectre Era
CCS '20: Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityPages 1871–1885https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417289To defeat ASLR or more advanced fine-grained and leakage-resistant code randomization schemes, modern software exploits rely on information disclosure to locate gadgets inside the victim's code. In the absence of such info-leak vulnerabilities, ...
- research-articleMarch 2020
Hurdle: Securing Jump Instructions Against Code Reuse Attacks
ASPLOS '20: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating SystemsPages 653–666https://doi.org/10.1145/3373376.3378506Code-reuse attacks represent the state-of-the-art in exploiting memory safety vulnerabilities. Control-flow integrity techniques offer a promising direction for preventing code-reuse attacks, but these attacks are resilient against imprecise and ...
- research-articleOctober 2015
Losing Control: On the Effectiveness of Control-Flow Integrity under Stack Attacks
- Mauro Conti,
- Stephen Crane,
- Lucas Davi,
- Michael Franz,
- Per Larsen,
- Marco Negro,
- Christopher Liebchen,
- Mohaned Qunaibit,
- Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
CCS '15: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityPages 952–963https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813671Adversaries exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to hijack a program's control flow and gain arbitrary code execution. One promising mitigation, control-flow integrity (CFI), has been the subject of extensive research in the past decade. One of the ...