R2C: AOCR-Resilient Diversity with Reactive and Reflective Camouflage
Pages 488 - 504
Abstract
Address-oblivious code reuse, AOCR for short, poses a substantial security risk, as it remains unchallenged. If neglected, adversaries have a reliable way to attack systems, offering an operational and profitable strategy. AOCR's authors conclude that software diversity cannot mitigate AOCR, because it exposes fundamental limits to diversification.
Reactive and reflective camouflage, or R2C for short, is a full-fledged, LLVM-based defense that thwarts AOCR by combining code and data diversification with reactive capabilities through booby traps. R2C includes optimizations using AVX2 SIMD instructions, compiles complex real-world software, such as browsers, and offers full support of C++. R2C thus proves that AOCR poses no fundamental limits to software diversification, but merely indicates that code diversification without data diversification is a dead end.
An extensive evaluation along multiple dimensions proves the practicality of R2C. We evaluate the impact of our defense on performance, and find that R2C shows low performance impacts on compute-intensive benchmarks (6.6 -- 8.5% geometric mean on SPEC CPU 2017). A security evaluation indicates R2C's resistance against different types of code-reuse attacks.
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Index Terms
- R2C: AOCR-Resilient Diversity with Reactive and Reflective Camouflage
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ISBN:9781450394871
DOI:10.1145/3552326
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