Export Citations
Save this search
Please login to be able to save your searches and receive alerts for new content matching your search criteria.
- research-articleMay 2022
ADD-based spectral analysis of probing security
DATE '22: Proceedings of the 2022 Conference & Exhibition on Design, Automation & Test in EuropePages 987–992In this paper, we introduce a novel exact verification methodology for non-interference properties of cryptographic circuits. The methodology exploits the Algebraic Decision Diagram representation of the Walsh spectrum to overcome the potential slow ...
- research-articleJanuary 2021
A permission-dependent type system for secure information flow analysis
Journal of Computer Security (JOCS), Volume 29, Issue 2Pages 161–228https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-200036We introduce a novel type system for enforcing secure information flow in an imperative language. Our work is motivated by the problem of statically checking potential information leakage in Android applications. To this end, we design a lightweight type ...
- research-articleOctober 2019
A type system for data independence of loop iterations in a directive-based PGAS language
MPLR 2019: Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Managed Programming Languages and RuntimesOctober 2019, Pages 50–62https://doi.org/10.1145/3357390.3361021Data independence of iterations of a loop statement in a partitioned global address space (PGAS) language is a sufficient condition to enable parallel processing of the loop iterations on distributed memories. However, checking data independence is ...
- research-articleJuly 2019
Toward On-chip Network Security Using Runtime Isolation Mapping
ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO), Volume 16, Issue 3Article No.: 28, Pages 1–25https://doi.org/10.1145/3337770Many-cores execute a large number of diverse applications concurrently. Inter-application interference can lead to a security threat as timing channel attack in the on-chip network. A non-interference communication in the shared on-chip network is a ...
- research-articleApril 2019
Statically analyzing information flows: an abstract interpretation-based hyperanalysis for non-interference
SAC '19: Proceedings of the 34th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium on Applied ComputingPages 2215–2223https://doi.org/10.1145/3297280.3297498In the context of systems security, information flows play a central role. Unhandled information flows potentially leave the door open to very dangerous types of attacks, such as code injection or sensitive information leakage. Information flows ...
-
- research-articleFebruary 2018
Abstract Non-Interference: A Unifying Framework for Weakening Information-flow
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS), Volume 21, Issue 2Article No.: 9, Pages 1–31https://doi.org/10.1145/3175660Non-interference happens when some elements of a dynamic system do not interfere, i.e., do not affect, other elements in the same system. Originally introduced in language-based security, non-interference means that the manipulation of private ...
- research-articleOctober 2017
Design-time Quantification of Integrity in Cyber-physical Systems
PLAS '17: Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for SecurityPages 63–74https://doi.org/10.1145/3139337.3139347In a software system it is possible to quantify the amount of information that is leaked or corrupted by analysing the flows of information present in the source code. In a cyber-physical system, information flows are not only present at the digital ...
- research-articleOctober 2017
Annotated Multisemantics To Prove Non-Interference Analyses
PLAS '17: Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for SecurityPages 49–62https://doi.org/10.1145/3139337.3139344The way information flows into programs can be difficult to track. As non-interference is a hyperproperty relating the results of several executions of a program, showing the correctness of an analysis is quite complex. We present a framework to ...
- research-articleOctober 2017
Verifying Security Policies in Multi-agent Workflows with Loops
CCS '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityPages 633–645https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134080We consider the automatic verification of information flow security policies of web-based workflows, such as conference submission systems like EasyChair. Our workflow description language allows for loops, non-deterministic choice, and an unbounded ...
- research-articleApril 2017
An Architecture Supporting Formal and Compositional Binary Analysis
- Joseph McMahan,
- Michael Christensen,
- Lawton Nichols,
- Jared Roesch,
- Sung-Yee Guo,
- Ben Hardekopf,
- Timothy Sherwood
ASPLOS '17: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating SystemsPages 177–191https://doi.org/10.1145/3037697.3037733Building a trustworthy life-critical embedded system requires deep reasoning about the potential effects that sequences of machine instructions can have on full system operation. Rather than trying to analyze complete binaries and the countless ways ...
Also Published in:
ACM SIGPLAN Notices: Volume 52 Issue 4ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News: Volume 45 Issue 1 - research-articleDecember 2016
Non-interference in Partial Order Models
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS), Volume 16, Issue 2Article No.: 44, Pages 1–34https://doi.org/10.1145/2984639Non-interference (NI) is a property of systems stating that confidential actions should not cause effects observable by unauthorized users. Several variants of NI have been studied for many types of models but rarely for true concurrency or unbounded ...
- research-articleOctober 2016
On Formalizing Information-Flow Control Libraries
PLAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for SecurityPages 15–28https://doi.org/10.1145/2993600.2993608Many state-of-the-art IFC libraries support a variety of advanced features like mutuable data structures, exceptions, and concurrency, whose subtle interaction makes verification of security guarantees challenging. In this paper, we present a full-...
- research-articleOctober 2016
Strong Non-Interference and Type-Directed Higher-Order Masking
- Gilles Barthe,
- Sonia Belaïd,
- François Dupressoir,
- Pierre-Alain Fouque,
- Benjamin Grégoire,
- Pierre-Yves Strub,
- Rébecca Zucchini
CCS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityPages 116–129https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978427Differential power analysis (DPA) is a side-channel attack in which an adversary retrieves cryptographic material by measuring and analyzing the power consumption of the device on which the cryptographic algorithm under attack executes. An effective ...
- research-articleJuly 2015
A Causal View on Non-Interference*
AbstractThe concept of non-interference has been introduced to characterise the absence of undesired information flows in a computing system. Although it is often explained referring to an informal notion of causality - the activity involving the part ...
- research-articleNovember 2014
System-level Non-interference for Constant-time Cryptography
CCS '14: Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityPages 1267–1279https://doi.org/10.1145/2660267.2660283Cache-based attacks are a class of side-channel attacks that are particularly effective in virtualized or cloud-based environments, where they have been used to recover secret keys from cryptographic implementations. One common approach to thwart cache-...
- research-articleFebruary 2014
Sapper: a language for hardware-level security policy enforcement
- Xun Li,
- Vineeth Kashyap,
- Jason K. Oberg,
- Mohit Tiwari,
- Vasanth Ram Rajarathinam,
- Ryan Kastner,
- Timothy Sherwood,
- Ben Hardekopf,
- Frederic T. Chong
ASPLOS '14: Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systemsPages 97–112https://doi.org/10.1145/2541940.2541947Privacy and integrity are important security concerns. These concerns are addressed by controlling information flow, i.e., restricting how information can flow through a system. Most proposed systems that restrict information flow make the implicit ...
Also Published in:
ACM SIGPLAN Notices: Volume 49 Issue 4ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News: Volume 42 Issue 1 - research-articleJune 2013
SurfNoC: a low latency and provably non-interfering approach to secure networks-on-chip
- Hassan M. G. Wassel,
- Ying Gao,
- Jason K. Oberg,
- Ted Huffmire,
- Ryan Kastner,
- Frederic T. Chong,
- Timothy Sherwood
ISCA '13: Proceedings of the 40th Annual International Symposium on Computer ArchitecturePages 583–594https://doi.org/10.1145/2485922.2485972As multicore processors find increasing adoption in domains such as aerospace and medical devices where failures have the potential to be catastrophic, strong performance isolation and security become first-class design constraints. When cores are used ...
Also Published in:
ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News: Volume 41 Issue 3 - keynoteJune 2013
Fault-tolerant non-interference: invited talk abstract
PLAS '13: Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for securityPages 1–2https://doi.org/10.1145/2465106.2489089This work is about specifying and ensuring security in unreliable systems. We study systems which are subject to transient faults -- soft errors that cause stored values to be corrupted. Transient faults occur in hardware when a high-energy particle ...
- research-articleJune 2013
Position paper: Sapper -- a language for provable hardware policy enforcement
- Xun Li,
- Vineeth Kashyap,
- Jason K. Oberg,
- Mohit Tiwari,
- Vasanth Ram Rajarathinam,
- Ryan Kastner,
- Timothy Sherwood,
- Ben Hardekopf,
- Frederic T. Chong
PLAS '13: Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for securityPages 39–44https://doi.org/10.1145/2465106.2465214We describe Sapper, a language for creating critical hardware components that have provably secure information flow. Most systems that enforce information flow policies place the hardware microarchitecture within the trusted computing base, and also ...