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SpecGuard: Specification Aware Recovery for Robotic Autonomous Vehicles from Physical Attacks
CCS '24: Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityPages 1849–1863https://doi.org/10.1145/3658644.3690210Robotic Autonomous Vehicles (RAVs) rely on their sensors for perception, and follow strict mission specifications (e.g., altitude, speed, and geofence constraints) for safe and timely operations. Physical attacks can corrupt the RAVs' sensors, resulting ...
- research-articleNovember 2024
BackMon: IC Backside Tamper Detection using On-Chip Impedance Monitoring
ASHES '24: Proceedings of the 2024 Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware SecurityPages 68–77https://doi.org/10.1145/3689939.3695784The expansion of flip-chip technologies and a lack of backside protection make the integrated circuit (IC) vulnerable to certain classes of physical attacks mounted from the IC's backside. Laser-assisted probing, electromagnetic, and body-biasing ...
- research-articleJuly 2024
Diagnosis-guided Attack Recovery for Securing Robotic Vehicles from Sensor Deception Attacks
ASIA CCS '24: Proceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityPages 915–929https://doi.org/10.1145/3634737.3644997Sensors are crucial for perception and autonomous operation in robotic vehicles (RV). Unfortunately, RV sensors can be compromised by physical attacks such as sensor tampering or spoofing. In this paper, we present DeLorean, a unified framework for ...
- research-articleJanuary 2024
Adversarial catoptric light: An effective, stealthy and robust physical‐world attack to DNNs
AbstractRecent studies have demonstrated that finely tuned deep neural networks (DNNs) are susceptible to adversarial attacks. Conventional physical attacks employ stickers as perturbations, achieving robust adversarial effects but compromising ...
In view of the invisibility and robustness of the existing physical attacks, the authors propose the adversarial catoptric light, which uses genetic algorithm to optimise the physical parameters of the catoptric light to perform black‐box physical ...
- ArticleOctober 2023
Using Model Optimization as Countermeasure against Model Recovery Attacks
Applied Cryptography and Network Security WorkshopsPages 196–209https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41181-6_11AbstractMachine learning (ML) and Deep learning (DL) have been widely studied and adopted for different applications across various fields. There is a growing demand for ML implementations as well as ML accelerators for small devices for Internet-of-...
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- research-articleNovember 2022
Hardware Moving Target Defenses against Physical Attacks: Design Challenges and Opportunities
MTD'22: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Workshop on Moving Target DefensePages 25–36https://doi.org/10.1145/3560828.3564010The concept of moving target defense (MTD) has entrenched itself as a viable strategy to reverse the typical asymmetries in cyber warfare. MTDs are technologies that seek to make target systems dynamically change in order to limit the time and ...
- research-articleMay 2021
On resilience of security-oriented error detecting architectures against power attacks: a theoretical analysis
CF '21: Proceedings of the 18th ACM International Conference on Computing FrontiersPages 229–237https://doi.org/10.1145/3457388.3458867It has been previously shown that hardware implementation of fault attack countermeasures based on error-detecting codes (EDCs) can make the circuit more vulnerable to power analysis attacks. We revisit this finding and show that the hypothesis space ...
- research-articleMarch 2021
Hardware Security for and beyond CMOS Technology
ISPD '21: Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Physical DesignPages 115–126https://doi.org/10.1145/3439706.3446902As with most aspects of electronic systems and integrated circuits, hardware security has traditionally evolved around the dominant CMOS technology. However, with the rise of various emerging technologies, whose main purpose is to overcome the ...
- research-articleSeptember 2020
NoiSense Print: Detecting Data Integrity Attacks on Sensor Measurements Using Hardware-based Fingerprints
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS), Volume 24, Issue 1Article No.: 2, Pages 1–35https://doi.org/10.1145/3410447Fingerprinting of various physical and logical devices has been proposed for uniquely identifying users or devices of mainstream IT systems such as PCs, laptops, and smart phones. However, the application of such techniques in Industrial Control Systems (...
- research-articleSeptember 2020
A bus authentication and anti-probing architecture extending hardware trusted computing base off CPU chips and beyond
ISCA '20: Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE 47th Annual International Symposium on Computer ArchitecturePages 749–761https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCA45697.2020.00067Tamper-proof hardware designs present a great challenge to computer architects. Most existing research limits hardware trusted computing base (TCB) to a CPU chip and anything off the CPU chip is vulnerable to probing and tampering. This paper introduces ...
- research-articleMay 2018
NoisePrint: Attack Detection Using Sensor and Process Noise Fingerprint in Cyber Physical Systems
- Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed,
- Martin Ochoa,
- Jianying Zhou,
- Aditya P. Mathur,
- Rizwan Qadeer,
- Carlos Murguia,
- Justin Ruths
ASIACCS '18: Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityPages 483–497https://doi.org/10.1145/3196494.3196532An attack detection scheme is proposed to detect data integrity attacks on sensors in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). A combined fingerprint for sensor and process noise is created during the normal operation of the system. Under sensor spoofing attack, ...
- research-articleDecember 2017
Compiler-Assisted Loop Hardening Against Fault Attacks
ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO), Volume 14, Issue 4Article No.: 36, Pages 1–25https://doi.org/10.1145/3141234Secure elements widely used in smartphones, digital consumer electronics, and payment systems are subject to fault attacks. To thwart such attacks, software protections are manually inserted requiring experts and time. The explosion of the Internet of ...
- research-articleJuly 2016
DARPA: Device Attestation Resilient to Physical Attacks
WiSec '16: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile NetworksPages 171–182https://doi.org/10.1145/2939918.2939938As embedded devices (under the guise of "smart-whatever") rapidly proliferate into many domains, they become attractive targets for malware. Protecting them from software and physical attacks becomes both important and challenging. Remote attestation is ...
- short-paperMay 2016
RamCrypt: Kernel-based Address Space Encryption for User-mode Processes
ASIA CCS '16: Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityPages 919–924https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897924We present RamCrypt, a solution that allows unmodified Linux processes to transparently work on encrypted data. RamCrypt can be deployed and enabled on a per-process basis without recompiling user-mode applications. In every enabled process, data is ...
- research-articleJanuary 2016
A dynamic active shield against shield rerouting attack
International Journal of High Performance Computing and Networking (IJHPCN), Volume 9, Issue 5-6Pages 462–469https://doi.org/10.1504/ijhpcn.2016.080419An active shield is a sensor mesh devised and implemented on top of most secure chips or in a secure embedded system as a good protection for circuits and sensitive data stored in the chips. It is one of the most effective annoyances for microprobing ...
- research-articleOctober 2015
PyCRA: Physical Challenge-Response Authentication For Active Sensors Under Spoofing Attacks
CCS '15: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityPages 1004–1015https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813679Embedded sensing systems are pervasively used in life- and security-critical systems such as those found in airplanes, automobiles, and healthcare. Traditional security mechanisms for these sensors focus on data encryption and other post-processing ...
- research-articleJune 2015
Joint Cyber and Physical Attacks on Power Grids: Graph Theoretical Approaches for Information Recovery
SIGMETRICS '15: Proceedings of the 2015 ACM SIGMETRICS International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer SystemsPages 361–374https://doi.org/10.1145/2745844.2745846Recent events demonstrated the vulnerability of power grids to cyber attacks and to physical attacks. Therefore, we focus on joint cyber and physical attacks and develop methods to retrieve the grid state information following such an attack. We ...
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ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review: Volume 43 Issue 1 - research-articleApril 2015
Vulnerability Analysis of PRINCE and RECTANGLE using CPA
CPSS '15: Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System SecurityPages 81–87https://doi.org/10.1145/2732198.2732207As Internet of Things (IoT) evolves very rapidly, security components (cryptographic algorithm, protocol) of embedded devices need to be secure against software and physical attacks. However, the performance factors namely speed, area, and power play a ...
- research-articleOctober 2014
Encoding the state of integrated circuits: a proactive and reactive protection against hardware Trojans horses
WESS '14: Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Embedded Systems SecurityArticle No.: 7, Pages 1–10https://doi.org/10.1145/2668322.2668329Hardware Trojan Horses (HTH) are a serious threat to semiconductor industry with significant economic impact. However, most of the research in HTH focuses on detection. We propose the concept of "encoded circuit", as a technique to protect HTH ...
- short-paperJune 2014
Cyber defenses for physical attacks and insider threats in cloud computing
ASIA CCS '14: Proceedings of the 9th ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications securityPages 519–524https://doi.org/10.1145/2590296.2590310In cloud computing, most of the computations and data in the data center do not belong to the cloud provider. This leaves owners of applications and data concerned about cyber and physical attacks which may compromise the confidentiality, integrity or ...