ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

In multiwinner approval voting, the goal is to select a k-member committee based on voters’ approval ballots. A well-studied concept of proportionality in this context is the justified representation (JR) axiom, which demands that no large cohesive group ...

In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size k among a group of n is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of being selected by ...

We study the inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in symmetric unweighted network congestion games. We first explore the impact of symmetry on the worst-case PoA of network congestion games. For polynomial delay functions with highest degree p, we ...

We revisit the setting of fairly allocating indivisible items when agents have different weights representing their entitlements. First, we propose a parameterized family of relaxations for weighted envy-freeness and the same for weighted proportionality; ...