Risk-Robust Mechanism Design for a Prospect-Theoretic Buyer
Consider the revenue maximization problem of a risk-neutral seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer, whose values for the items are drawn from known distributions. If the buyer is also risk-neutral, it is known that a ...
On the Existence of Three-Dimensional Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences
We study the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. This model involves three types of agents, with an equal number of agents of each type. The types form a cyclic order such that each agent has a complete preference ...
Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) has recently emerged as the solution concept of interest to study incentive compatibility in presence of agents with a specific form of bounded rationality, i.e., those who have no contingent reasoning skill ...