The airport problem is a classical and well-known model of fair cost-sharing for a single facility among multiple agents. This paper extends it to a more general setting involving multiple facilities. Specifically, in our model, each agent selects a ...

In this study, we propose a polyhedral clinching auction for indivisible goods, which has so far been studied for divisible goods. As in the divisible setting by Goel et al. (2015), our mechanism enjoys incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and ...

We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching k-stable if no other matching exists that is more beneficial to at ...

We evaluate the fairness of a rule allocating among agents with equal rights by computing their utility for a hypothetical worst-case share, which only depends on their own valuation and the number of agents. For indivisible goods, Budish proposed the ...

Many two-sided platforms are known to steer customers toward certain products based on their willingness to pay. In this article, we study platforms’ incentives to adopt this type of market segmentation and present conditions under which this can generate ...

In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The sender’s utility ...

In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size k among a group of n is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of being selected by ...

In multiwinner approval voting, the goal is to select a k-member committee based on voters’ approval ballots. A well-studied concept of proportionality in this context is the justified representation (JR) axiom, which demands that no large cohesive group ...

We revisit the setting of fairly allocating indivisible items when agents have different weights representing their entitlements. First, we propose a parameterized family of relaxations for weighted envy-freeness and the same for weighted proportionality; ...

We study the inefficiency of pure Nash equili bria in symmetric unweighted network congestion games. We first explore the impact of symmetry on the worst-case PoA of network congestion games. For polynomial delay functions with highest degree p, we ...

We study the power of price discrimination via an intermediary in bilateral trade, when there is a revenue-maximizing seller selling an item to a buyer with a private value drawn from a prior. Between the seller and the buyer, there is an intermediary ...

Efficient allocation of tasks to workers is a central problem in crowdsourcing. In this article, we consider a setting inspired by spatial crowdsourcing platforms, where both workers and tasks arrive at different times, and each worker-task assignment ...

We introduce a reciprocity protocol, an innovative approach to coordinating and sharing rewards in blockchains. Inherently decentralized and implementable, it puts emphasis on incentives rather than forcing specific sharing rules from the outset. ...

A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal utility functions over the alternatives, but voting rules have access to only ...

Algorithmic matching is a pervasive mechanism in our social lives and is becoming a major medium through which people find romantic partners and potential spouses. However, romantic matching markets pose a principal-agent problem with the potential for ...

We consider clustering games in which the players are embedded into a network and want to coordinate (or anti-coordinate) their strategy with their neighbors. The goal of a player is to choose a strategy that maximizes her utility given the strategies of ...

We consider the Arrow–Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents’ demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for WGS demands ...

Shared/buy-in computing systems offer users the option to select between buy-in and shared services. In such systems, idle buy-in resources are made available to other users for sharing. With strategic users, resource purchase and allocation in such ...

In a classical online decision problem, a decision-maker who is trying to maximize her value inspects a sequence of arriving items to learn their values (drawn from known distributions) and decides when to stop the process by taking the current item. The ...

We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, chores, and copies, as a unified framework for studying: (1) the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for goods with copies; (2) the existence of EFX and other solution ...