Abstract
Security-critical systems are an important application area for formal methods. However, such systems often contain cryptographic subsystems. The natural definitions of these subsystems are probabilistic and in most cases computational. Hence it is not obvious how one can treat cryptographic subsystems in a sound way within formal methods, in particular if one does not want to encumber the proof of an overall system by probabilities and computational restrictions due only to its cryptographic subsystems.
We survey our progress on integrating cryptography into formal models, in particular our work on reactive simulatability (RSIM), a refinement notion suitable for cryptography. We also present the underlying system model which unifies a computational and a more abstract presentation and allows generic distributed scheduling. We show the relation of RSIM and other types of specifications, and clarify what role the classical Dolev-Yao (term algebra) abstractions from cryptography can play in the future.
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Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M. (2006). Formal Methods and Cryptography. In: Misra, J., Nipkow, T., Sekerinski, E. (eds) FM 2006: Formal Methods. FM 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4085. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11813040_44
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11813040_44
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-37215-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-37216-5
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