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A New Non-random Property of 4.5-Round PRINCE

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Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2020 (ICISC 2020)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12593))

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Abstract

PRINCE is a widely analyzed block cipher proposed in 2012. Subspace trail cryptanalysis is a new cryptanalytic technique to generalize the invariant subspace attack. So far, two subspace trails that exist with probability 1 are known for 2.5 rounds of PRINCE. In this paper, we first describe a new non-random property for 4.5 rounds of PRINCE based on subspace trail with certain probability, which is independent of the secret key, the details of the Linear layer and of the S-Box layer. Then, we obtain that by appropriate choices of difference for a number of input pairs, it is possible to make sure that the number of times that the difference of the resulting output pairs lie in a particular subspace is always a multiple of 8. Later, a detailed proof is given as why it has to exist. Relying on this property, a new distinguisher can be set up to distinguish the 4.5-round PRINCE from a random permutation.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank all anonymous referees for their valuable comments. This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61672509, No. 62072445), and the National Cryptography Development Foundation of China (no. MMJJ20170101).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. TCA Laboratory, SKLCS, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, People’s Republic of China

    Bolin Wang, Chan Song, Wenling Wu & Lei Zhang

  2. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100049, People’s Republic of China

    Bolin Wang, Chan Song, Wenling Wu & Lei Zhang

Authors
  1. Bolin Wang
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  2. Chan Song
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  3. Wenling Wu
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  4. Lei Zhang
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Correspondence to Bolin Wang or Wenling Wu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Jeonbuk National University, Jeonju-si, Korea (Republic of)

    Deukjo Hong

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Wang, B., Song, C., Wu, W., Zhang, L. (2021). A New Non-random Property of 4.5-Round PRINCE. In: Hong, D. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2020. ICISC 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12593. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68890-5_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68890-5_11

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