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Cache-Side-Channel Quantification and Mitigation for Quantum Cryptography

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Computer Security – ESORICS 2021 (ESORICS 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12973))

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Abstract

Quantum cryptography allows one to transmit secret information securely, based on the laws of quantum physics. It consists of (1) the transmission of physical particles like photons and (2) the software-based processing of measurements during the transmission. Quantum key distribution (QKD), e.g., transmits material for establishing a shared crypto key in this way. The key material is encoded into the particles in a way that leakage can be detected and mitigated via so-called privacy amplification.

In this article, we investigate the role of the software implementation for the security of quantum cryptography. More concretely, we quantify the security of QKD software against cache side channels and show how to integrate cache-side-channel mitigation with the privacy amplification in QKD. We evaluate our approach at one variant of a QKD software that is in practical use. During our evaluation, we detect a cache-side-channel vulnerability, for which we develop a parametric mitigation that combines privacy amplification and program rewriting. We propose a cost model for the combined mitigation, which allows one to optimize the interaction between privacy amplification and program rewriting for the mitigation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Available at https://www.mais.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/qkd-esorics21.html.

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Acknowledgements

Funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) - SFB 1119 - 236615297. We also gratefully acknowledge support by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Hessian Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and the Arts within their joint support of the National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE. We thank the reviewers and Boris Köpf for their helpful comments, Tim Weißmantel for his implementation contributions, and the authors of CacheAudit for making the tool publicly available.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Alexandra Weber, Johannes Schickel & Heiko Mantel

  2. Department of Physics, Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Oleg Nikiforov, Alexander Sauer, Gernot Alber & Thomas Walther

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  1. Alexandra Weber
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  2. Oleg Nikiforov
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  4. Johannes Schickel
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  5. Gernot Alber
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  7. Thomas Walther
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Correspondence to Alexandra Weber .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA

    Elisa Bertino

  2. National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE, Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT, Darmstadt, Germany

    Haya Shulman

  3. National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT, Darmstadt, Germany

    Michael Waidner

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Weber, A. et al. (2021). Cache-Side-Channel Quantification and Mitigation for Quantum Cryptography. In: Bertino, E., Shulman, H., Waidner, M. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2021. ESORICS 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12973. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_12

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