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Chameleon-Hashes with Dual Long-Term Trapdoors and Their Applications

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Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2018 (AFRICACRYPT 2018)

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Abstract

A chameleon-hash behaves likes a standard collision-resistant hash function for outsiders. If, however, a trapdoor is known, arbitrary collisions can be found. Chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors (\(\mathsf {CHET}\); Camenisch et al., PKC 17) allow prohibiting that the holder of the long-term trapdoor can find collisions by introducing a second, ephemeral, trapdoor. However, this ephemeral trapdoor is required to be chosen freshly for each hash.

We extend these ideas and introduce the notion of chameleon-hashes with dual long-term trapdoors (\(\mathsf {CHDLTT}\)). Here, the second trapdoor is not chosen freshly for each new hash; Rather, the hashing party can decide if it wants to generate a fresh second trapdoor or use an existing one. This primitive generalizes \(\mathsf {CHET}\)s, extends their applicability and enables some appealing new use-cases, including three-party sanitizable signatures, group-level selectively revocable signatures and break-the-glass signatures. We present two provably secure constructions and an implementation which demonstrates that this extended primitive is efficient enough for use in practice.

The project leading to this work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 644962 prismacloud and No 321310 percy.

K. Samelin—This work was done while the third author was also at IBM Research – Zurich.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the case of identity-based chameleon-hashes w.r.t. to some identity.

  2. 2.

    Also referred to as nonce or tag.

  3. 3.

    The randomness r is also sometimes called “check value” [3].

  4. 4.

    Note, there might be corner cases for authorizing everyone as described by Pöhls [51].

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, Vienna, Austria

    Stephan Krenn & Daniel Slamanig

  2. ISL & Chair of IT-Security, University of Passau, Passau, Germany

    Henrich C. Pöhls

  3. TU Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Kai Samelin

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  1. Stephan Krenn
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Correspondence to Stephan Krenn .

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  1. Fondation Partenariale de Sorbonne Université, Paris, France

    Antoine Joux

  2. Université de Caen, Caen, France

    Abderrahmane Nitaj

  3. Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco

    Tajjeeddine Rachidi

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Krenn, S., Pöhls, H.C., Samelin, K., Slamanig, D. (2018). Chameleon-Hashes with Dual Long-Term Trapdoors and Their Applications. In: Joux, A., Nitaj, A., Rachidi, T. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2018. AFRICACRYPT 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10831. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89339-6_2

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