Abstract
Side-channel attacks are a very powerful cryptanalytic technique. Li and Gu [ProvSec’07] proposed an approach against side-channel attacks, which states that a symmetric encryption scheme is IND-secure in side-channel model, if it is IND-secure in black-box model and there is no adversary who can recover the whole key of the scheme computationally in side-channel model, i.e. WKR-SCA ∧ IND → IND-SCA. Our researches show that it is not the case. We analyze notions of security against key recovery attacks and security against distinguishing attacks, and then construct a scheme which is WKR-SCA-secure and IND-secure, but not IND-SCA-secure in the same side-channel environment. Furthermore, even if the scheme is secure again partial key recovery attacks in side-channel model, this approach still does not hold true.
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Wang, P., Feng, D., Wu, W., Zhang, L. (2009). On the Correctness of an Approach against Side-Channel Attacks. In: Bao, F., Li, H., Wang, G. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5451. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00843-6_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00843-6_29
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