Abstract
Some of the best-known results in mechanism design depend critically on Myerson’s (Math Oper Res 6:58–73, 1981) regularity condition. For example, the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main findings. First, a new interpretation of regularity is developed—similar to that of a monotone hazard rate—in terms of being the next to fail. Second, using expanded concepts of concavity, a tight sufficient condition is obtained for a density to define a regular distribution. New examples of regular distributions are identified. Applications are discussed.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Equivalently, the marginal revenue of a monopolist facing inverse demand \(p=F^{-1}(1-q)\) is strictly declining in output (Bulow and Roberts 1989).
For a helpful discussion of the respective classes of distributions with increasing and decreasing hazard rate, see Hoppe et al. (2011).
Indeed, the log-normal distribution is regular provided its skewness is smaller than \((e^{2}+2)\sqrt{e^{2}-1}\approx 23.73\) (see Table 1 and the Appendix).
See also the discussion following the theorem.
More formally, let \(m\ge 1\) denote the exact number of machines that are still working at time \(x\). Then, the likelihood for a given machine to be the next to fail is
$$\begin{aligned} l(x)&= \sum _{m=1}^{M}\frac{1}{m}\genfrac(){0.0pt}{}{M-1}{m-1}(1-F(x))^{m-1}F(x)^{M-m}\\&= \frac{1}{M(1-F(x))}\sum _{m=1}^{M}\genfrac(){0.0pt}{}{M}{m}(1-F(x))^{m}F(x)^{M-m}\\&= \frac{1-F(x)^{M}}{M(1-F(x))}. \end{aligned}$$Therefore, for \(x\) kept fixed, \(l(x)\) is indeed asymptotically equivalent to \(1/M(1-F(x))\) as \(M\rightarrow \infty \). Further, one can check that \(\partial l/\partial x\approx f(x)/M(1-F(x))^{2}\). This follows from differentiating the precise expression for \(l(x)\) derived above.
The zoom rate formulation of increasing virtual valuations has been taken up already by Szech (2011) to predict over- and underinvestment in attracting bidders to an auction.
Monteiro and Svaiter (2010) study optimal design for arbitrary distributions. For example, the support of the distribution may have gaps, and there may be mass points. Obviously, there is no role for regularity under such general conditions.
Theorem 5.1 can be applied also if the density function has finitely many convex kinks and jump discontinuities. In such cases, one requires strong \((-\frac{1}{2})\)-concavity of \(f\) in each smooth segment, and strong \((-1)\)-concavity of \(F\) just left of critical points. For a proof, one constructs a strongly \((-\frac{1}{2})\)-concave extension of the density right of the critical point. The details are omitted.
In fact, for unimodal densities, strong \((-\frac{1}{2} )\)-concavity is required only on the increasing tail of the density, which also explains the many positive findings in the rightmost column of Table 2.
Chung and Ely (2007) assume discrete type distributions, but their results could probably be extended to continuous distributions.
References
An, M.Y.: Logconcavity versus logconvexity: a complete characterization. J. Econ. Theory 80, 350–369 (1998)
Bagnoli, M., Bergström, T.: Log-concave probability and its applications. Econ. Theory 26, 445–469 (2005). doi:10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4
Baldwin, L., Marshall, R.C., Richard, J.F.: Bidder collusion at forest service timber sales. J. Political Econ. 105, 657–699 (1997)
Barlow, R.E., Proschan, F.: Statistical Theory of Reliability and Life Testing: Probability Models. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York (1975)
Baron, D.P., Myerson, R.B.: Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Econometrica 50, 911–930 (1982)
Bulow, J., Roberts, J.: The simple economics of optimal auctions. J. Political Econ. 97, 1060–1090 (1989)
Caplin, A., Nalebuff, B.: Aggregation and social choice: a mean voter proposition. Econometrica 59, 1–23 (1991a)
Caplin, A., Nalebuff, B.: Aggregation and imperfect competition: on the existence of equilibrium. Econometrica 59, 25–59 (1991b)
Cheng, H., Tan, G.: Asymmetric common value auctions with applications to private value auctions with resale. Econ. Theory 45, 253–290 (2010)
Chung, K.-S., Ely, J.C.: Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. Rev. Econ. Stud 74, 447–476 (2007)
Dierker, E.: Competition for customers. In: Barnett, W.A., Cornet, B., d’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J., Mas-Colell, A. (eds.) Equilibrium Theory and Applications: Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, pp. 383–402. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1991)
Finner, H., Roters, M.: Log-concavity and inequalities for Chi-square, \(F\) and beta distributions with applications in multiple comparisons. Stat. Sin. 7, 771–787 (1997)
Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., Vuong, Q.: Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica 68, 525–574 (2000)
Hafalir, I., Krishna, V.: Asymmetric auctions with resale. Am. Econ. Rev. 98, 87–112 (2008)
Hoppe, H.C., Moldovanu, B., Ozdenoren, E.: Coarse matching with incomplete information. Econ. Theory 47, 75–104 (2011)
Ivanov, M.: Information revelation in competitive markets. Econ. Theory (2011). doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0629-3
Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., Stacchetti, E.: Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities. J. Econ. Theory 85, 258–293 (1999)
Laffont, J.-J., Ossard, H., Vuong, Q.: Econometrics of first-price auctions. Econometrica 63, 953–980 (1995)
Maskin, E., Riley, J.: Optimal multi-unit auctions. In: Hahn, F. (ed.) The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, pp. 312–335. Clarendon, Oxford (1989)
McAfee, P., McMillan, J.: Auctions and bidding. J. Econ. Lit. 25, 699–738 (1987)
Monteiro, P.K., Svaiter, B.F.: Optimal auction with a general distribution: Virtual valuation without densities. J. Math. Econ. 46, 21–31 (2010)
Myerson, R.: Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6, 58–73 (1981)
Myerson, R., Satterthwaite, M.: Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. J. Econ. Theory 29, 265–281 (1983)
Nöldeke, G., Samuelson, L.: Optimal bunching without optimal control. J. Econ. Theory 134, 405–420 (2007)
Prékopa, A.: On logarithmic concave measures and functions. Acta Sci. Math. 34, 335–343 (1973)
Riley, J., Samuelson, W.: Optimal auctions. Am. Econ. Rev. 71, 381–392 (1981)
Saks, S.: Theory of the Integral. Hafner, New York (1937)
Szech, N.: Optimal advertising of auctions. J. Econ. Theory 146, 2596–2607 (2011)
van den Berg, G.: On the uniqueness of optimal prices set by monopolistic sellers. J. Econom. 141, 482–491 (2007)
Virág, G.: First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders. Econ. Theory (2011). doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0666-y
Zeng, Z.: A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization. Econ. Theory (2011). doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0662-2
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
For helpful comments, I would like to thank the Editor, an anonymous referee, and participants of 2009 Far East and South Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society in Tokyo. The paper has further benefited from discussions with Benny Moldovanu, Georg Nöldeke, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Larry Samuelson. Finally, I am indebted to Carlo Possenti, Roman Smirnov, and YingYing Tan for their exquisite research assistance.
Appendix: Parameterized distributions
Appendix: Parameterized distributions
This Appendix outlines the derivations underlying Tables 1 and 2. The main tool is the following smooth criterion for \(\rho \)-concavity.
Lemma A.1.
Let \(f>0\) be twice continuously differentiable on some interval \(X\subseteq \mathbb R \), with a discrete set \(X_{1}\) over which \(f^{\prime }(x)=0\). Then, for finite \(\rho \), the function \(f\) is \(\rho \)-concave if and only if \(r_{f}(x)\equiv -(\ln f(x))^{\prime \prime }/(\ln f(x))^{\prime 2}\ge \rho \) for all \(x\in X\setminus X_{1}\).
Proof.
A straightforward calculation shows that \(r_{f}(x)=1-f(x)f^{\prime \prime }(x)/f^{\prime }(x)^{2}\). Hence, \(r_{f} (x)\ge \rho \) if and only if \(f(x)f^{\prime \prime }(x)\le (1-\rho )f^{\prime }(x)^{2}\), provided \(f^{\prime }(x)\ne 0\). By continuity, this proves the assertion. \(\square \)
Lemma A.1 reduces the determination of the global concavity parameter to a straightforward minimization problem. More specifically, to find the tightest parameter \(\rho \) for which a given \(f\) is \(\rho \)-concave, one calculates the minimum (or infimum) of \(r_{f}(x)\) on \(X\). Table 1 shows the results for selected examples. A particular case is the Pearson distribution. Its density function solves the differential equation \(f^{\prime }(x)=f(x)(x-x^{M})/\chi (x)\) for \(x^{M}\in \mathbb R \) and \(\chi (x)=b_{0}+b_{1}x+b_{2}x^{2}\), where \(b_{0},b_{1},b_{2}\in \mathbb R \). We focus on distributions with unbounded support and such that \(\chi (x^{M})<0\). Then, \(f\) is \(b_{2}\)-concave. Thus, both \(J_{f}\) and \(K_{f}\) are increasing provided that \(b_{2}>-\frac{1}{2}\).
Table 2 shows examples of distributions that do not allow a strongly \((-\frac{1}{2})\)-concave density function. Unless noted otherwise, all parameter values are strictly positive. The only regular example is the mirror-image Pareto distribution. The entries of the form \(J_{f}^{\prime } \ngeq 0\), \(K_{f}^{\prime }\ngeq 0\), or “mixed” have been established by direct calculation at boundary values. In some cases, numerical calculations have been used. The entries with \(K_{f}^{\prime }>0\) are typically straightforward, e.g., when the density function is everywhere declining. Some cases, however, need additional arguments. For example, both the log-normal distribution and the F distribution (Finner and Roters 1997) possess a log-normal distribution function, even though the corresponding density functions are not log-normal. In other cases (inverse gamma distribution and inverse Chi-squared), the density function is log-concave for low values and decreasing for high values, which again is sufficient for \(K_{f}^{\prime }>0\).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ewerhart, C. Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho \)-concavity. Econ Theory 53, 591–603 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3