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Artificial Intelligence: building birds out of beer cans

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2009

Summary

John Searle's attack on various interpretations of Artificial Intelligence has been the most thorough challenge to the philosophical foundations of Artificial Intelligence. In this paper we attempt to contribute to a growing body of argument as to why Searle is mistaken in his attack. We propose an analogy between intelligent objects and flying objects, leading to a definition of Artificial Intelligence similar to that of aerodynamics, but one which attempts to present general laws of intelligence in man and machines alike.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1987

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References

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