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Using VMM-based sensors to monitor honeypots

Published: 14 June 2006 Publication History

Abstract

Virtual Machine Monitors (VMMs) are a common tool for implementing honeypots. In this paper we examine the implementation of a VMM-based intrusion detection and monitoring system for collecting information about attacks on honeypots. We document and evaluate three designs we have implemented on two open-source virtualization platforms: User-Mode Linux and Xen. Our results show that our designs give the monitor good visibility into the system and thus, a small number of monitoring sensors can detect a large number of intrusions. In a three month period, we were able to detect five different attacks, as well as collect and try 46 more exploits on our honeypots. All attacks were detected with only two monitoring sensors. We found that the performance overhead for monitoring such intrusions is independent of which events are being monitored, but depends entirely on the number of monitoring events and the underlying monitoring implementation. The performance overhead can be significantly improved by implementing the monitor directly in the privileged code of the VMM, though at the cost of increasing the size of the trusted computing base of the system.

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cover image ACM Conferences
VEE '06: Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Virtual execution environments
June 2006
194 pages
ISBN:1595933328
DOI:10.1145/1134760
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 14 June 2006

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Author Tags

  1. IDS
  2. honeypot monitoring
  3. intrusion detection
  4. virtual machine monitor

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  • (2023)A survey of contemporary open-source honeypots, frameworks, and toolsJournal of Network and Computer Applications10.1016/j.jnca.2023.103737220(103737)Online publication date: Nov-2023
  • (2021)Virtual Machine Introspection in Virtualization: A Security PerspectiveProceedings of the 2021 Thirteenth International Conference on Contemporary Computing10.1145/3474124.3474140(117-124)Online publication date: 5-Aug-2021
  • (2021)Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) Banner Language Variations as an Adaptive Honeypot Deterrent of Unauthorized AccessProceedings of the 16th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security10.1145/3465481.3470032(1-7)Online publication date: 17-Aug-2021
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  • (2018)Vanguard: A Cache-Level Sensitive File Integrity Monitoring System in Virtual Machine EnvironmentIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2018.28511926(38567-38577)Online publication date: 2018
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