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Shake it up baby: scheduling with package auctions

Published: 11 June 2007 Publication History

Abstract

In many disciplines success depends onaccess to scarce resources, such as unique instruments. Researchon computer-supported cooperative work has contributed to the development of technologies, such as collaboratories, that broaden access to scarce scientific and engineering resources. While broader access is often applauded, little attention has been focused on the problem of equitable and efficient resource allocation in the face of increased demand created through collaboratory use. This paper, then, uses the framework of mechanism design to evaluate different resource allocation schemes (RAD, Vickery, and knapsack). Experimental results show that knapsack achieves a more equitable distribution of resources than RAD or Vickery, but that RAD and Vickery are both more efficient than knapsack. The findings highlight the need for systematic exploration of allocation mechanisms within collaboratories, where simple optimization (e.g., knapsack) is likely to produce a sub-optimal match of resources to needs. More generally, the findings illustrate the utility of experimental economic approaches in understanding issues that emerge in large-scale collaborations, such as entire scientific and engineering communities.

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cover image ACM Conferences
EC '07: Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
June 2007
384 pages
ISBN:9781595936530
DOI:10.1145/1250910
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 11 June 2007

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Author Tags

  1. collaboratory
  2. combinatorial auction
  3. cyberinfrastructure
  4. mechanism design
  5. resource allocation

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EC07
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EC07: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
June 11 - 15, 2007
California, San Diego, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 7 - 11, 2025
Stanford , CA , USA

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