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View all- Apt KZvesper J(2010)The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic GamesGames10.3390/g10403811:4(381-394)Online publication date: 8-Oct-2010
Epistemic analysis of strategic games with arbitrary strategy sets
Pages 25 - 32
Abstract
We provide here an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on the possibility correspondences. Such an analysis calls for the use of transfinite iterations of the corresponding operators. Our approach is based on Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem and applies both to the notions of rationalizability and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
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- Epistemic analysis of strategic games with arbitrary strategy sets
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Published: 25 June 2007
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View all- Apt KZvesper J(2010)The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic GamesGames10.3390/g10403811:4(381-394)Online publication date: 8-Oct-2010
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