Cited By
View all- Moulin H(2009)Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objectsJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.003144:1(96-119)Online publication date: Jan-2009
Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
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- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
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Published: 01 December 2007
Published in SIGECOM Volume 7, Issue 1
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View all- Moulin H(2009)Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objectsJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.003144:1(96-119)Online publication date: Jan-2009
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