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Implementable allocation rules

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Dov MondererAuthors Info & Claims

ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Volume 7, Issue 2

Article No.: 4, Pages 1 - 3

https://doi.org/10.1145/1399589.1399593

Published: 01 June 2008 Publication History

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Implementable allocation rules

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Published In

ACM SIGecom Exchanges Volume 7, Issue 2

June 2008

60 pages

EISSN:1551-9031

DOI:10.1145/1399589

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

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Published: 01 June 2008

Published in SIGECOM Volume 7, Issue 2

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