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Solutions of strategic games under common belief of sure-thing principle

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Michael TrostAuthors Info & Claims

TARK '09: Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge

Pages 247 - 256

https://doi.org/10.1145/1562814.1562847

Published: 06 July 2009 Publication History

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Abstract

In this paper we address the issue which solution concept for strategic games is consistent to common belief that each player satisfies the sure-thing principle. Traditional epistemic analysis takes for granted that there is common belief that each player acts according to some expected utility function. Because our presumptions are milder than the traditional ones we are forced to modify the traditional epistemic approach and follow the idea of Morris (1996) to fasten the beliefs of the players to their preferences. One central finding of our paper is that common belief of sure-thing principle plus state-independence characterizes the solution concept proposed by Börgers (1993).

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Index Terms

Solutions of strategic games under common belief of sure-thing principle
1. Computing methodologies
  1. Artificial intelligence
    1. Knowledge representation and reasoning
      1. Logic programming and answer set programming
      2. Nonmonotonic, default reasoning and belief revision
2. Theory of computation
  1. Logic
    1. Constraint and logic programming

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Published In

TARK '09: Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge

July 2009

272 pages

ISBN:9781605585604

DOI:10.1145/1562814

Program Chair:
Aviad Heifetz
The Open University of Israel

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 06 July 2009

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TARK '09

TARK '09: The 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge

July 6 - 8, 2009

California

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TARK '09 Paper Acceptance Rate 29 of 77 submissions, 38%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 61 of 177 submissions, 34%

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Is There a Violation of Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game?

A Thorough Axiomatization of a Principle of Conditional Preservation in Belief Revision

The Principle of Conditional Preservation in Belief Revision

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Is There a Violation of Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game?

A Thorough Axiomatization of a Principle of Conditional Preservation in Belief Revision

The Principle of Conditional Preservation in Belief Revision

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