abstract

Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: a field experiment

Authors:

Michael Ostrovsky,

Michael SchwarzAuthors Info & Claims

EC '11: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Pages 59 - 60

https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993585

Published: 05 June 2011 Publication History

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Abstract

We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, following the introduction of new reserve prices revenues in these auctions have increased substantially.

References

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Dubey AFeng ZKidambi RMehta AWang DBaeza-Yates RBonchi F(2024)Auctions with LLM SummariesProceedings of the 30th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining10.1145/3637528.3672022(713-722)Online publication date: 25-Aug-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3637528.3672022
Shen WTang PZuo SShen WTang PZuo S(2024)Dynamic Mechanism Design via AI-Driven ApproachesAI-Driven Mechanism Design10.1007/978-981-97-9286-3_3(53-93)Online publication date: 30-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-9286-3_3
Ma YLi WZhang WLei YZhang ZQi QLiu QWang X(2024)Joint Bidding in Ad AuctionsTheory and Applications of Models of Computation10.1007/978-981-97-2340-9_29(344-354)Online publication date: 3-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2340-9_29
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Index Terms

Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: a field experiment
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics

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Published In

EC '11: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

June 2011

384 pages

ISBN:9781450302616

DOI:10.1145/1993574

General Chair:
Yoav Shoham
Stanford University, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Yan Chen
University of Michigan, USA
,
Tim Roughgarden
Stanford University, USA

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 05 June 2011

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EC '11

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SIGecom

EC '11: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

June 5 - 9, 2011

California, San Jose, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

July 7 - 11, 2025

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Dubey AFeng ZKidambi RMehta AWang DBaeza-Yates RBonchi F(2024)Auctions with LLM SummariesProceedings of the 30th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining10.1145/3637528.3672022(713-722)Online publication date: 25-Aug-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3637528.3672022
Shen WTang PZuo SShen WTang PZuo S(2024)Dynamic Mechanism Design via AI-Driven ApproachesAI-Driven Mechanism Design10.1007/978-981-97-9286-3_3(53-93)Online publication date: 30-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-9286-3_3
Ma YLi WZhang WLei YZhang ZQi QLiu QWang X(2024)Joint Bidding in Ad AuctionsTheory and Applications of Models of Computation10.1007/978-981-97-2340-9_29(344-354)Online publication date: 3-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2340-9_29
Chen QLiang JGolrezaei NBouneffouf D(2023)Interpolating Item and User Fairness in Recommendation SystemsSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4476512Online publication date: 2023
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Wang HDu CFang PHe LWang LZheng BSingh ASun YAkoglu LGunopulos DYan XKumar ROzcan FYe J(2023)Adversarial Constrained Bidding via Minimax Regret Optimization with Causality-Aware Reinforcement LearningProceedings of the 29th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining10.1145/3580305.3599254(2314-2325)Online publication date: 6-Aug-2023
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Li WQi QWang CYu C(2023)Optimally Integrating Ad Auction into E-Commerce PlatformsFrontiers of Algorithmic Wisdom10.1007/978-3-031-20796-9_4(44-58)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2023
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Derakhshan MGolrezaei NPaes Leme R(2022)Linear Program-Based Approximation for Personalized Reserve PricesManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2020.389768:3(1849-1864)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2022
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Jiang HCui TYang K(2022)Design of Sponsored Search Auction Mechanism for Federated Learning Advertising PlatformComputational Intelligence and Neuroscience10.1155/2022/57874912022(1-15)Online publication date: 7-Apr-2022
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Abeille MBouchard BCroissant L(2022)Diffusive Limit Approximation of Pure-Jump Optimal Stochastic Control ProblemsJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications10.1007/s10957-022-02135-7196:1(147-176)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2022
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Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions

Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising

Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies

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