research-article

N-party BAR Transfer: motivation, definition, and challenges

Authors:

Xavier Vilaça,

Luís RodriguesAuthors Info & Claims

TADDS '11: Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Theoretical Aspects of Dynamic Distributed Systems

Pages 18 - 22

https://doi.org/10.1145/2034640.2034647

Published: 19 September 2011 Publication History

Abstract

This paper introduces the N-party BAR Transfer service. The service aims at transferring data from a group of replicated producers to a group of replicated consumers, in a setting where the behaviour of the processes is characterized by the Byzantine Altruistic Rational (BAR) model. The problem is motivated, a precise definition of problem is presented, and the challenges on solving the problem are discussed.

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Cited By

Geffner ITennenholtz MKleinberg RSaban DBergemann D(2024)Making a Nash Equilibrium Resilient to CoalitionsProceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3670865.3673552(213-238)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3670865.3673552
Ranchal-Pedrosa AGramoli VSuga YSakurai KDing XSako K(2022)TRAPProceedings of the 2022 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3488932.3517386(168-181)Online publication date: 30-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3488932.3517386

Index Terms

N-party BAR Transfer: motivation, definition, and challenges
1. Computer systems organization
  1. Architectures
    1. Distributed architectures
2. Software and its engineering
  1. Software organization and properties
    1. Software system structures
      1. Distributed systems organizing principles

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cover image ACM Other conferences

TADDS '11: Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Theoretical Aspects of Dynamic Distributed Systems

September 2011

33 pages

ISBN:9781450309462

DOI:10.1145/2034640

General Chairs:
Roberto Baldoni
University of Rome
,
Alexander A. Shvarstman
University of Connecticut

Copyright © 2011 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 19 September 2011

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TADDS '11

TADDS '11: Workshop on Theoretical Aspects on Dynamic Distributed Systems

September 19, 2011

Rome, Italy

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Cited By

Geffner ITennenholtz MKleinberg RSaban DBergemann D(2024)Making a Nash Equilibrium Resilient to CoalitionsProceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3670865.3673552(213-238)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3670865.3673552
Ranchal-Pedrosa AGramoli VSuga YSakurai KDing XSako K(2022)TRAPProceedings of the 2022 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3488932.3517386(168-181)Online publication date: 30-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3488932.3517386

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