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Blacksheep: detecting compromised hosts in homogeneous crowds

Published: 16 October 2012 Publication History

Abstract

The lucrative rewards of security penetrations into large organizations have motivated the development and use of many sophisticated rootkit techniques to maintain an attacker's presence on a compromised system. Due to the evasive nature of such infections, detecting these rootkit infestations is a problem facing modern organizations. While many approaches to this problem have been proposed, various drawbacks that range from signature generation issues, to coverage, to performance, prevent these approaches from being ideal solutions.
In this paper, we present Blacksheep, a distributed system for detecting a rootkit infestation among groups of similar machines. This approach was motivated by the homogenous natures of many corporate networks. Taking advantage of the similarity amongst the machines that it analyses, Blacksheep is able to efficiently and effectively detect both existing and new infestations by comparing the memory dumps collected from each host.
We evaluate Blacksheep on two sets of memory dumps. One set is taken from virtual machines using virtual machine introspection, mimicking the deployment of Blacksheep on a cloud computing provider's network. The other set is taken from Windows XP machines via a memory acquisition driver, demonstrating Blacksheep's usage under more challenging image acquisition conditions. The results of the evaluation show that by leveraging the homogeneous nature of groups of computers, it is possible to detect rootkit infestations.

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cover image ACM Conferences
CCS '12: Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
October 2012
1088 pages
ISBN:9781450316514
DOI:10.1145/2382196
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 16 October 2012

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Author Tags

  1. computer security
  2. kernel-based rootkits
  3. malicious software
  4. malware detection
  5. rootkit detection

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CCS'12
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CCS'12: the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
October 16 - 18, 2012
North Carolina, Raleigh, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 1,261 of 6,999 submissions, 18%

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  • (2021)SeCrowd: Efficient secure interactive crowdsourcing via permission-based signaturesFuture Generation Computer Systems10.1016/j.future.2020.09.033115(448-458)Online publication date: Feb-2021
  • (2020)PrivateEyeProceedings of the 17th Usenix Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation10.5555/3388242.3388300(797-816)Online publication date: 25-Feb-2020
  • (2017)ATOM: Efficient Tracking, Monitoring, and Orchestration of Cloud ResourcesIEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems10.1109/TPDS.2017.265246728:8(2172-2189)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2017
  • (2017)Black penguin: On the feasibility of detecting intrusion with homogeneous memory2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)10.1109/CNS.2017.8228671(586-594)Online publication date: Oct-2017
  • (2017)Lens on the Endpoint: Hunting for Malicious Software Through Endpoint Data AnalysisResearch in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses10.1007/978-3-319-66332-6_4(73-97)Online publication date: 12-Oct-2017
  • (2016)Automatic Uncovering of Tap Points from Kernel ExecutionsResearch in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses10.1007/978-3-319-45719-2_3(49-70)Online publication date: 7-Sep-2016
  • (2016)Trusted, Heterogeneous, and Autonomic Mobile CloudSecure System Design and Trustable Computing10.1007/978-3-319-14971-4_14(439-455)Online publication date: 2016
  • (2016)Heterogeneous Architectures: Malware and CountermeasuresSecure System Design and Trustable Computing10.1007/978-3-319-14971-4_13(421-438)Online publication date: 2016
  • (2015)Exploring VM IntrospectionACM SIGPLAN Notices10.1145/2817817.273119650:7(133-146)Online publication date: 14-Mar-2015
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