research-article

PREVE: a policy recommendation engine based on vector equilibria applied to reducing LeT's attacks

Authors:

John P. Dickerson,

Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi,

V. S. SubrahmanianAuthors Info & Claims

ASONAM '13: Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining

Pages 1084 - 1091

https://doi.org/10.1145/2492517.2500241

Published: 25 August 2013 Publication History

Abstract

We consider the problem of dealing with the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, as a five-player game. However, as different experts vary in their assessment of players' payoffs in this game (and other games), we identify multi-payoff equilibria through a novel combination of vector payoffs and well-supported ∈-approximate equilibria. We develop a grid search algorithm for computing such equilibria, and provide experimental validation using three payoff matrices filled in by experts in India-Pakistan relations. The resulting system, called PREVE, allows us to analyze the equilibria thus generated and suggest policies to reduce attacks by LeT. We briefly discuss the suggested policies and identify their strengths and weaknesses.

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Cited By

Chen HHajiaghayi MKraus SSawant ASerra ESubrahmanian VXiong Y(2020)PIE: A Data-Driven Payoff Inference Engine for Strategic Security ApplicationsIEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems10.1109/TCSS.2019.29571787:1(42-57)Online publication date: Feb-2020
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2019.2957178
Sawant ADickerson JHajiaghayi MSubrahmanian V(2015)Automated Generation of Counterterrorism Policies Using Multiexpert InputACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology10.1145/27163286:4(1-27)Online publication date: 10-Jul-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2716328
Subrahmanian VMannes ARoul ARaghavan RSubrahmanian VMannes ARoul ARaghavan R(2013)Suggested Counter-Terrorism PoliciesIndian Mujahideen10.1007/978-3-319-02818-7_9(115-132)Online publication date: 9-Nov-2013
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02818-7_9

Index Terms

PREVE: a policy recommendation engine based on vector equilibria applied to reducing LeT's attacks

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cover image ACM Conferences

ASONAM '13: Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining

August 2013

1558 pages

ISBN:9781450322409

DOI:10.1145/2492517

General Chairs:
Jon Rokne
University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada
,
Christos Faloutsos
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA

Copyright © 2013 ACM.

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Publication History

Published: 25 August 2013

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Research-article

Funding Sources

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Office of Naval Research
Division of Social and Economic Sciences
Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
Army Research Office
Air Force Office of Scientific Research
National Defense Science & Engineering Graduate (NDSEG) fellowship

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ASONAM '13

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ASONAM '13: Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining 2013

August 25 - 28, 2013

Ontario, Niagara, Canada

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Overall Acceptance Rate 116 of 549 submissions, 21%

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Cited By

Chen HHajiaghayi MKraus SSawant ASerra ESubrahmanian VXiong Y(2020)PIE: A Data-Driven Payoff Inference Engine for Strategic Security ApplicationsIEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems10.1109/TCSS.2019.29571787:1(42-57)Online publication date: Feb-2020
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2019.2957178
Sawant ADickerson JHajiaghayi MSubrahmanian V(2015)Automated Generation of Counterterrorism Policies Using Multiexpert InputACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology10.1145/27163286:4(1-27)Online publication date: 10-Jul-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2716328
Subrahmanian VMannes ARoul ARaghavan RSubrahmanian VMannes ARoul ARaghavan R(2013)Suggested Counter-Terrorism PoliciesIndian Mujahideen10.1007/978-3-319-02818-7_9(115-132)Online publication date: 9-Nov-2013
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02818-7_9

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