research-article

Local computation mechanism design

Authors:

Avinatan Hassidim,

Yishay Mansour,

Shai VardiAuthors Info & Claims

EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation

Pages 601 - 616

https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602839

Published: 01 June 2014 Publication History

Abstract

We introduce the notion of local computation mechanism design - designing game theoretic mechanisms that run in polylogarithmic time and space. Local computation mechanisms reply to each query in polylogarithmic time and space, and the replies to different queries are consistent with the same global feasible solution. When the mechanism employs payments, the computation of the payments is also done in polylogarithmic time and space. Furthermore, the mechanism needs to maintain incentive compatibility with respect to the allocation and payments.

We present local computation mechanisms for a variety of classical game-theoretical problems: (1) stable matching, (2) job scheduling, (3) combinatorial auctions for unit-demand and k-minded bidders, and (4) the housing allocation problem.

For stable matching, some of our techniques may have implications to the global (non-LCA) setting. Specifically, we show that when the men's preference lists are bounded, we can achieve an arbitrarily good approximation to the stable matching within a fixed number of iterations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.

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Cited By

Levi RRubinfeld RYodpinyanee A(2017)Local Computation Algorithms for Graphs of Non-constant DegreesAlgorithmica10.1007/s00453-016-0126-y77:4(971-994)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00453-016-0126-y
Rubinfeld R(2017)Can We Locally Compute Sparse Connected Subgraphs?Computer Science – Theory and Applications10.1007/978-3-319-58747-9_6(38-47)Online publication date: 6-May-2017
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58747-9_6
Mansour YRubinstein ATennenholtz MIndyk P(2015)Robust probabilistic inferenceProceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms10.5555/2722129.2722160(449-460)Online publication date: 4-Jan-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2722129.2722160
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Local computation mechanism design
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics

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cover image ACM Conferences

EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation

June 2014

1028 pages

ISBN:9781450325653

DOI:10.1145/2600057

General Chair:
Moshe Babaioff
Microsoft Research
,
Program Chairs:
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University
,
David Easley
Cornell University

Copyright © 2014 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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New York, NY, United States

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Published: 01 June 2014

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EC '14: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

June 8 - 12, 2014

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

Levi RRubinfeld RYodpinyanee A(2017)Local Computation Algorithms for Graphs of Non-constant DegreesAlgorithmica10.1007/s00453-016-0126-y77:4(971-994)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00453-016-0126-y
Rubinfeld R(2017)Can We Locally Compute Sparse Connected Subgraphs?Computer Science – Theory and Applications10.1007/978-3-319-58747-9_6(38-47)Online publication date: 6-May-2017
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58747-9_6
Mansour YRubinstein ATennenholtz MIndyk P(2015)Robust probabilistic inferenceProceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms10.5555/2722129.2722160(449-460)Online publication date: 4-Jan-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2722129.2722160
Ostrovsky RRosenbaum WGeorgiou CSpirakis P(2015)Fast Distributed Almost Stable MatchingsProceedings of the 2015 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing10.1145/2767386.2767424(101-108)Online publication date: 21-Jul-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2767386.2767424

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